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CLEAN SLATE: EXPANDING EXPUNGEMENTS AND 
PARDONS FOR NON-VIOLENT FEDERAL OFFENDERS 
Lahny R. Silva* 
Over the past forty years, the United States Congress has passed 
legislation expanding the federal criminal code intruding into an area 
typically reserved to the states.  The “tough on crime” rhetoric of the 
1980s and 1990s brought with it the enactment of various legislative 
initiatives: harsh mandatory minimum sentences for non-violent 
federal offenders, “truth in sentencing” laws that restricted or 
abolished parole and early release, and strict liability 
disqualifications from employment and federal benefits based solely 
on the fact of conviction.  The effect of this legislation was the 
creation of a new criminal class: a federal prison population.  
However, unlike the states the federal government does not have a 
legal mechanism in place adequately reintegrating federal offenders 
back into the American polity.  This has contributed to soaring federal 
incarceration rates, rising government costs for corrections, and a 
historically high rate of criminal recidivism.  This is a price tag the 
United States can no longer afford to pay. 
This Article argues that individuals who have served their sentences 
and abided by the law for some period afterward should be given the 
opportunity to rid their slates of their criminal histories.  Such 
expungement of criminal convictions for individuals who demonstrate 
that they will abide by the law are likely to reduce the costs of the 
criminal justice system and improve the lives of ex-offenders.  First, 
this Article examines post-conviction penalties and contemporary 
recidivism trends.  Second, this Article investigates the law governing 
federal pardons and judicial expungements, finding that the doctrines 
and their applications lack consistency, making it difficult for non-
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violent offenders to re-enter mainstream society.  This Article argues 
that simply eliminating post-conviction disabilities would be extremely 
complex and perhaps not practically or politically feasible.  
Moreover, the two existing federal post-conviction remedies—pardons 
and judicial expungements—are not designed to, and cannot as a 
practical matter, provide systematic relief from post-conviction 
disabilities.  Using state post-conviction mechanisms as examples, this 
Article argues that congressionally sanctioned expungements are an 
attractive alternative to relieve non-violent offenders of the effects of 
post-conviction disabilities.  I propose that the United States 
Sentencing Commission (U.S.S.C.) create a Second Chance Advisory 
Group to determine how best to ameliorate the collateral 
consequences of federal convictions.  With a Second Chance Advisory 
group, the U.S.S.C. could be used as a vehicle for researching and 
recommending legislative policy initiatives that will effectively slash 
incarceration, recidivism, and opportunity costs. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2003, the United States Federal Government spent $5.5 billion on 
federal corrections alone.1  This represents a 925% increase in direct and 
intergovernmental expenditures on federal corrections compared to 
1982.2  From 1982 to 2003, corrections expenditures grew at an average 
annual percentage rate of 11.2%, and they continue to swell.3  A major 
contributing factor to the increasing cost of federal corrections is the 
historically high rate of criminal recidivism.4  It is estimated that 
approximately 650,000 men and women are released annually from state 
and federal penal facilities.5  Many releasees will eventually return to 
prison, either by violating conditions of their release or by committing a 
new offense.6  It is estimated that two-thirds of released prisoners will 
 1. KRISTEN A. HUGHES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 2003 3 (2006) available at  http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jeeus03.pdf. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. H.R. REP. NO. 110-140, at 2 (2007), reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 24, 25 (where the 
House Report asserts that the “web of obstacles . . . have substantially contributed to the historically 
high rate of recidivism . . . .”). 
 5. Id. 
 6. MILES D. HARER, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS OFFICE OF RES. & EVALUATION, RECIDIVISM 
AMONG FEDERAL PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1987 2 (1994), available at http://www.bop.gov/news/ 
research_projects/published_reports/recidivism/oreprrecid87.pdf (reporting that the recidivism rate of 
the most recent study conducted by Bureau of Prisons releasees in 1997 was 40.8%).  See also U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE 
2
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commit a new crime within the first three years.7  This is a price tag that 
the United States government cannot afford to pay.8 
Understanding that the collateral consequences of incarceration are 
costing Americans billions of dollars annually, federal policymakers are 
shifting their focus from imprisonment toward breaking the cycle of 
recidivism.9  Over the past five years, legislative reforms have been 
drafted, introduced to Congress, or signed into law.  For example, 
George W. Bush signed the Second Chance Act into law in April 
2008.10  The legislation’s principal purpose is to put an end to criminal 
recidivism by providing federal assistance to various reentry and 
alternatives to incarceration programs.11  In fiscal year 2010, $100 
million was appropriated to fund Second Chance Act programs.12  In 
2009, Congressman Charles D. Rangel reintroduced the “Second Chance 
for Ex-Offenders Act of 2009” to the 111th Congress, which would 
allow individuals charged with a particular classification of federal 
crimes to be eligible for a newly created federal expungement.13  In the 
summer of 2009, the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Collateral Consequences of 
Conviction Act with the purpose of addressing the post-conviction 
consequences and legal barriers to reentry faced by thousands of ex-
offenders each year.14  While these efforts are an admirable step in the 
right direction, they fail to address the core problem: the record and 
stigma associated with conviction. 
Many states have attempted to ameliorate the effects of post-
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/Recidivism 
_General.pdf [hereinafter MEASURING RECIDIVISM]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RECIDIVISM AND THE 
“FIRST OFFENDER” (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/Recidivism_FirstOffender.pdf. 
 7. H.R. REP. NO. 110-140, at 2 (2007), reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 24, 25. 
 8. Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Implications of the Iron Law 
of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 308 (2009). 
 9. H.R. REP. NO. 110-140 (“‘prison after imprisonment’—a web of obstacles . . . limit their 
housing options, employment prospects, access to healthcare, and potential for family reunification.  
These obstacles have substantially contributed to the historically high rate of recidivism . . . .”); Second 
Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008) (Section 3(a)(1) explicitly states that 
one of the purposes of the Act is “to break the cycle of criminal recidivism.”). 
 10. Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008). 
 11. See id. § 3(a)(1); see also H.R. REP. NO. 110-140, at 1 (where the House Report provides that 
“H.R. 1593, the ‘Second Chance Act of 2007’ is intended to reduce recidivism, increase public safety, 
and help State and local governments better address the growing population of ex-offenders”).  The 
programs are primarily focused on treating substance abuse. 
 12. Reentry Policy Council, Second Chance Act Appropriations Update, http://reentrypolicy.org/ 
government_affairs/second_chance_act (last vitised March 21, 2010). 
 13. The Second Chance For Ex-Offenders Act of 2009, H.R. 1529, 111th Cong. 
 14. NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, THE UNIFORM COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT (2009), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ 
ucsada/2009am_approved.pdf. 
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conviction penalties on their releasees, but the federal government’s 
efforts have been delayed to say the least.  Many states have enacted 
some type of executive, legislative, or judicial mechanism that permits 
the use of post-conviction remedies to soften the severity of collateral 
consequences that result from a felony conviction.  Fourteen states 
utilize the governor’s pardoning power to expunge any record of 
conviction.15  Seventeen states have first-offender statutes permitting 
expungement or authorizing the sealing of first and minor offenses.16  
And thirty-two states and the District of Columbia allow judicial set-
asides or deferred adjudication for convictions after successful 
completion of a sentence, including probationary sentences or a specific 
waiting period.17  In contrast, federal law offers expungement for first 
time offenders on one criminal offense: simple possession of narcotics.18 
Part II of this Article presents a broad overview of recidivism and the 
effect of collateral consequences on ex-offenders.  While the focus of 
the Article is on the federal offender and the federal system, it is 
important to discuss state implications of a felony offender as well.19  
Part II demonstrates that America is forced to pay a variety of economic 
and political costs in exchange for the enactment and enforcement of 
collateral consequences.  Part III reviews the remedies currently 
available to federal offenders, including presidential pardons and 
judicial petitions for expungement.  The two existing federal post-
conviction remedies are not designed to, and cannot as a practical 
matter, provide systematic relief from post-conviction disabilities.  Part 
IV examines the expungement programs in Massachusetts, California, 
and Connecticut.  This Part examines the different state methods used to 
 15. MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A 
CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE tbl.5 (2009) (These states include 
Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia.). 
 16. Id. (These states include Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, and Utah.). 
 17. Id. (These states include Arizona, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and 
Wyoming.). 
 18. The Federal First Offender Act, 18 U.S.C § 3607(c) (2006) (providing for the expungement 
of disposition records for individuals found guilty of simple narcotic possession (21 U.S.C. § 844) with 
no prior convictions). 
 19. The state in which the federal offender returns is likely to have in place its own state statutes 
and regulations imposing collateral consequences on ex-offenders.  Moreover, state remedies are 
typically not available to the federal offender due to federalism concerns.  These features compound 
reentry efforts of the federal offender making him unique. 
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reintegrate state offenders back into mainstream society.  Part V 
discusses an approach in which a comprehensive federal legislative plan 
for expungement can be crafted and executed—a mechanism for 
obtaining a clean slate.  This Article advocates for the creation of a 
Second Chance Advisory Group to the United States Sentencing 
Commission.  This group would be charged with investigating criminal 
recidivism, collateral consequences, and the costs associated with both.  
After adequately examining these issues, this group would be charged 
with recommending legislative initiatives to resolve these concerns 
including the creation of a comprehensive federal expungement program 
for non-violent federal offenders. 
II. POST-CONVICTION PENALTIES AND RECIDIVISM 
Post-conviction penalties involve a web of political, social, and 
economic obstacles faced by ex-offenders.20  They are numerous and 
potent.  These consequences take the form of mandatory exclusions and 
restrictions that operate outside of the public view and beyond the 
normal sentencing framework.21  Reentry scholar Jeremy Travis called 
this phenomenon the “invisible punishment.”22  This punishment begins 
the day the ex-offender is released and often results in a return to prison 
shortly thereafter.23 
A. Definitions 
As a starting point, it is important to be clear on how terms are 
defined in this Article.  For purposes of this Article, recidivism is 
defined in accordance with the U.S.S.C.’s understanding.24  Recidivism 
consists of one of the following: (1) re-conviction of a new offense or 
(2) revocation of probation/parole.25  For purposes of this Article, an 
expungement is defined as the removal of the record of criminal 
conviction and related documents from public purview and general 
public accessibility.  Expungement would not, however, destroy law 
enforcement accessibility.  Maintaining such records for an extended 
period of time is in the interest of public safety.  The understanding of 
 20. H.R. REP. NO. 110-140, at 2 (2007), reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 24, 25. 
 21. Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE 
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 15–19 (Marc Mauer & 
Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002). 
 22. Id. 
 23. H.R. REP NO. 110-140. 
 24. MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra note 6, at 4. 
 25. Id.  The U.S.S.C. also considers re-arrest a component of the definition of “recidivism.” 
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the legal effect of an expungement is taken from the Federal First 
Offender Act and is adopted for purposes of this Article: 
The effect of the order shall be to restore such person, in the 
contemplation of the law, to the status he occupied before such arrest or 
institution of criminal proceedings.  A person concerning whom such an 
order has been entered shall not be held thereafter under any provision of 
law to be guilty of perjury, false swearing, or making a false statement by 
reason of his failure to recite or acknowledge such arrests or institution of 
criminal proceedings, or the results thereof, in response to an inquiry 
made of him for any purpose.26 
It is important to understand that this Article only focuses on the non-
violent federal offender.  The additional restrictions and special 
conditions on violent offenders and immigrant populations are beyond 
the scope of this Article.27  The definition of non-violent is the inverse 
definition of “violent” taken from the Armed Career Criminal Act (the 
Act).28  The Act was chosen due to the guidance it offers regarding 
Congress’s potential stance on legal elements that define non-violent 
offenders.  Thus, a non-violent offender is defined as an individual, who 
has been convicted of a crime that does not have an element requiring 
“the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the 
person . . . of another.”29  For purposes of this Article, those convicted 
of drug trafficking/possession and property crimes are included in this 
class of offenders.  At last count federal prisoners convicted of drug 
offenses comprised 53.5% of the prison population.30  Finally, the term 
collateral consequence is defined as a statutory and/or regulatory 
disqualification occurring in both the public and private sectors resulting 
from a criminal conviction. 
 26. The Federal First Offender Act, 18 U.S.C § 3607(c) (2006). 
 27. It is important to note that I also advocate for this system for the violent offender however, 
the concerns and restrictions regarding that sub-group are beyond the scope of this paper.  I also 
recognize that there are numerous immigration implications on this topic but they too are beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
 28. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006).  The ACCA defines 
“violent felony” as a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” and either “(i) 
has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; 
or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”  See also Chambers v. United States, 129 
S.Ct. 687 (2009); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008). 
 29. § 924(e)(2)(B). 
 30. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE OF THE BUREAU 2007 52, 
available at http://www.bop.gov/news/PDFs/sob07.pdf. 
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B. Recidivism 
Recidivism is problematic and expensive.  Republican Representative 
Frank Wolf stated that members of Congress are “deeply concerned 
about the recidivism crisis that is straining our corrections system at all 
levels.”31  After decades of mandatory minimums, “truth” in sentencing 
and the abolition of parole, the federal government is taking steps 
toward reforming the way America punishes.  There seems to be a 
growing sense that “the revolving door” in and out of prison results in 
the breakdown of families, collapse of local economies, and destruction 
of entire communities. 
The last formal recidivism study tracking a cohort of federal prisoners 
was conducted by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) in 1987 and 
published in 1994.32  This will be referred to as the “Harer study,” and it 
is the most recent research focusing squarely on federal offender 
recidivism over a three year period.33  Recent state recidivism studies 
conducted in the past few years are comparable with the results of the 
Harer study.34 
The Harer study was based on a representative sample of 1,205 BOP 
inmates.35  It found that within the first three years of their release, 
40.8% of the former inmates had recidivated.36  The rates were highest 
 31. Congressional Leaders Take on Recidivism and Corrections Spending, NAT’L REENTRY RES. 
CTR., Jan. 28, 2010, available at http://www.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/announcements/ 
congressional-leaders-take-on-recidivism-and-corrections-spending (last visited March 21, 2010). 
 32. HARER, supra note 6. 
 33. This information was verified through a phone conversation with the BOP Office of 
Research on February 21, 2010.  More recent federal recidivism studies conducted by the U.S.S.C. in 
2003 have focused on first-time federal offenders and recidivism in relation to the accuracy of the 
Criminal History Category. 
 34. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY & PLANNING DIV. UNIT, CONN. OFFICE OF POLICY MGMT., 2010 
ANNUAL RECIDIVISM REPORT (2010) [hereinafter CONN. OPM 2010 STUDY]; CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
POLICY & PLANNING DIV. UNIT, CONN. OFFICE OF POLICY MGMT., 2009 CONNECTICUT RECIDIVISM 
STUDY (2009) [hereinafter CONN. OPM 2009 STUDY]; HOLLIE MATTHEWS & CHRISTOPHER CALIA, 
MASS. DEP’T OF CORR., RECIDIVISM OF 2002 RELEASED DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION INMATES (MAY 
2009) [hereinafter MASS. 2009 STUDY]; STEVEN J. SEMMANN, WIS. SENTENCING COMM’N, THREE 
CRITICAL SENTENCING ELEMENTS REDUCE RECIDIVISM: A COMPARISON BETWEEN ROBBERS AND 
OTHER OFFENDERS, (2006) [hereinafter WIS. 2006 STUDY]; ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR., ARIZONA INMATE 
RECIDIVISM STUDY, (2005), available at http://www.adc.state.az.us/adc/reports/recidivism_2005.pdf; 
NANCY G. LA VIGNE & CYNTHIA A. MAMALIAN, URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., PRISONER 
REENTRY IN GEORGIA, (2004) [hereinafter GA. 2000 STUDY]; FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., FLORIDA 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS RECIDIVISM REPORT: INMATES RELEASED FROM FLORIDA PRISONS 
JULY 1995 TO JUNE 2001 (2003). 
 35. HARER, supra note 6, at 1. 
 36. Id.  Cf. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=17 (last visited March 16, 2010) (reporting that the recidivism rate for 300,000 
prisoners released in 1994 in fifteen states was 67.5%); CONN. OPM 2010 STUDY, supra note 34, at 4 
(stating that recidivism rate for 2005 cohort that was returned to prison with new charges for either a 
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within the first year of release with a rate of 20.3%.37  In the first six 
months of release 11.3% of the sample recidivated.38  An additional 
11.4% of new releasees recidivated in year two and 9.1% in year three.39  
The study documented the monthly recidivism rate over a thirty-six 
month period and found that the rate dropped from twenty-nine per one 
thousand individuals recidivating in the first month to two per one 
thousand individuals recidivating in the thirty-sixth month.40  Thus, 
there is a downhill slope from month one to month thirty-six signifying 
a decrease in the risk of recidivism as time passes.41 
Post-release employment appears to be a, if not the, determinative 
factor in post-release success.  The majority of offenses, both primary 
incarcerating and recidividating, consist of economic crimes such as 
drug trafficking, theft, larceny, etc., which suggests that many crimes are 
committed with an economic objective—getting paid.42  In the Harer 
study ex-offenders, who arranged for post-release employment, had a 
recidivism rate of 27.6% compared to 53.9% of those who did not.43  In 
other words, post-release employment appears to cut the recidivism rate 
by almost half. 
Moreover, the Harer study concluded that those offenders released to 
a halfway house prior to being released back to the community were 
more successful than those directly released to the community because 
the halfway house increases the likelihood of obtaining post-release 
employment.44  Of the 614 people in the sample who went to halfway 
supervision violation or to begin a new prison sentence was 56.5%); CONN. OPM 2009 STUDY, supra 
note 34, at 10 (stating that recidivism rate for 2004 cohort that was returned to prison at least once in the 
three year study was 56%); WIS. 2006 STUDY, supra note 34, at 1 (stating that recidivism rates vary 
from 39% to 58% depending on the number of prior offenses); MASS. 2009 STUDY, supra note 34, at v 
(reporting recidivism rate for 2002 cohort at 40%); GA. 2000 STUDY, supra note 34, at 18 (reporting 
recidivism rate for 2000 cohort at 36%). 
 37. HARER, supra note 6, at 2.  Cf. CONN OPM 2010 study, supra note 34, app. at 3 (stating the 
recidivism rate for 2005 cohort that was returned to prison within twelve months was 34.2%); MASS. 
2009 STUDY, supra note 34, at v (reporting recidivism rate within the first eighteen months for 2002 
cohort at 28%). 
 38. HARER, supra note 6, at 2. 
 39. Id. at 9. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.  State studies also show a downhill slope from month one to month thirty-six.  See 
RHIANA KOHL ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., MASSACHUSETTS RECIDIVISM STUDY: A 
CLOSER LOOK AT RELEASES AND RETURNS TO PRISON 22 (2008) (showing a decrease in recidivism 
from month one at 18% compared with month thirty-six at 9%); CONN. OPM 2010 STUDY, supra note 
34, app. at 3 (demonstrating a downhill slope of recidivism (returning to prison) in month one with five 
hundred nine returnees compared with month thirty-six with eighty returnees). 
 42. HARER, supra note 6, at 52. 
 43. Id. at 4–5.  See MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra note 6, at 12. 
 44. HARER, supra note 6, at 63–66; CHRISTY VISHER ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., 
EMPLOYMENT AFTER PRISON: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF RELEASEES IN THREE STATES 1 (2008), 
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houses, 68.1% obtained employment compared to 22% of those released 
directly to the community.45  This disparity is largely due to halfway 
house selection where individuals are selected due to their 
employability.46  Thus, halfway house release has an indirect positive 
effect on reentry through the opportunity of employment.  Therefore, it 
comes as no surprise that post-release employment has a positive effect 
on reducing recidivism. 
Education also seems to play an important role in success.  The Harer 
study demonstrated that recidivism is inversely related to education 
level.  Those offenders entering prison with an education of eighth grade 
or less who participated in Adult Basic Education and GED courses had 
a lower recidivism rate than those who opted out.47  The same is true of 
those entering prison with some high school education and participating 
in Adult Continuing Education, Post-Secondary Education, and Adult 
Basic Education.48  Family and spousal support appears just as 
determinative with those releasees living with a spouse post-release 
recidivating at a rate of 20.0% while those with other living 
arrangements recidivating at a rate of 47.9%.49 
There is no classic textbook profile for a typical recidivist.  One must 
piece together a picture from the sparse statistical evidence available on 
BOP recidivism.  The highest recidivism rate, at 64%, was among those 
in prison for robbery or other crimes against a person, excluding sex 
offenses, manslaughter, and homicide.50  Drug trafficking and fraud had 
the lowest recidivism rates at 34.2% and 20.8% respectively.51  The 
largest number of recidivating events were arrests for drug trafficking or 
possession followed by larceny and parole violations.52  Males and 
females recidivated at almost the same rate with 40.9% of men 
available at http://www.urban.org/publications/411778.html. 
 45. HARER, supra note 6, at 63. 
 46. Id. at 64. 
 47. Id. at 23–25. 
 48. Id. at 4–5.  See MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra note 6, at 12 (showing that while education 
correlates with lower levels of recidivism, there is an exception for recidivism rates for offenders with 
college educations.  This group tends to have a higher rate or recidivism than other educated groups.). 
 49. HARER, supra note 6, at 5.  Cf. CHRISTY VISHER ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., 
THE IMPACT OF MARITAL AND RELATIONSHIP STATUS ON SOCIAL OUTCOMES FOR RETURNING 
PRISONERS 6 (2009), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411778_employment_after_ 
prison.pdf. 
 50. See HARER, supra note 6, at 3; WIS. 2006 STUDY, supra note 34, at 1 (stating that convicted 
robbers recidivate at a higher rate, 65%, compared with most other offenders at a rate of 35%). 
 51. See HARER, supra note 6, at 3. 
 52. See id. at 6 (The recidivating events broke down as follows: 25.3% for drug trafficking or 
possession; 13.1% for larceny theft, 13.1% for parole violations, and 6.9% for assault.). 
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recidivating compared with 39.7% of women.53  Recidivism rates were 
highest among African-Americans with 58.8% of releasees recidivating 
followed by Hispanics at 45.2% and Whites at 33.5%.54  Those with a 
history of drug or alcohol abuse were more likely to recidivate than 
those without such history.55  Older ex-offenders were less likely to 
return to prison with a rate of recidivism of 15.3% for individuals fifty-
five years of age or older compared to a 56.6% rate for persons twenty-
five years and younger.56  People with more schooling were less likely 
to return to prison as well those employed full time prior to the federal 
offense.57 
From the available data, it can be determined that employment is 
critical to the success of a new releasee.  Education and family support 
are also key factors in a smooth transition from prison to the community.  
The collateral consequences outlined in the next section serve as major 
roadblocks to economic opportunity, access to education, and family 
reunification.  These collateral consequences undermine the very factors 
that have been shown to decrease recidivism and increase public safety.  
An expungement program could reduce the consequences discussed in 
detail in the next section. 
C. Collateral Consequences and the Loss of Opportunity 
Something as simple as checking a box indicating a conviction bars a 
person from employment, housing, educational assistance, and 
government benefits.  Collateral consequences take the form of 
employment disqualifications in the public and private sectors, 
prohibitions on federal educational subsidies, housing exclusions, public 
benefit ineligibility, and political punishment.58  They are commonly 
justified on preventative grounds.59  The consequences are thought to 
deter ex-offenders from committing new crimes while also protecting 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. at 2. 
 55. See id. at 4 (Heroin abusers had the highest rate of recidivism with a rate of 69.5%, while 
powder cocaine users had the lowest rate of recidivism at 51.3%.). 
 56. See id. at 3; MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra note 6, at 12. 
 57. HARER, supra note 6, at 3. 
 58. Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585, 594–
99 (2006); Christopher Mele & Teresa A. Miller, Collateral Civil Penalties as Techniques of Social 
Policy, in  CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES, 19–20 (Christopher Mele & Teresa A. Miller 
eds., 2005); Travis, supra note 21, at 22–23. 
 59. Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral 
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 160 (1999). 
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the public from the criminal’s influence.60  On another level they are 
considered to provide a denunciatory purpose and retributive function.61  
These theoretical justifications do less to serve the stated objectives and 
more to provide a strong argument for the designation of collateral 
consequences as part of the sentencing court’s punishment for the 
original offense.62  This web of obstacles significantly contributes to the 
current recidivism rate.63  Moreover, the ex-offender faces a double 
penalty: he pays his debt through incarceration and also pays through 
loss of opportunity.  This opportunity cost is socioeconomic, political, 
and seemingly never ending. 
1. Employment as a “Rehabilitative Necessity” 
So strong is the inverse correlation between employment and recidivism 
that employment is considered a “rehabilitative necessity.”64 
Employment is intrinsic to the American identity.  Maintaining 
employment is not only a prerequisite to membership in society but is 
also a staple to the survival of the American family.  Without 
employment, one is stripped of the ability to provide for himself or his 
family.  An individual who does not participate in the labor market is not 
only economically disadvantaged but is also socially marred.65  
Joblessness is a primary factor in recidivism and also one of the most 
severe post-conviction penalties.66  Many ex-offenders released from 
prison face this obstacle head-on and are repeatedly rejected, denied, and 
virtually excluded from the qualified applicant pool based solely on their 
previous conviction. 
Stepping out of prison, ex-offenders have fewer employment 
opportunities and a decreased lifetime earning potential.67  It is 
 60. Id. at 161; Marlaina Freisthler & Mark A. Godsey, Going Home to Stay: A Review of 
Collateral Consequences of Conviction, Post-Incarceration Employment, and Recidivism in Ohio, 36 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 525, 529 (2005). 
 61. Demleitner, supra note 59, at 160. 
 62. Id. 
 63. H.R. REP. NO. 110-140, at 2 (2007), reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 24, 25. 
 64. Freisthler & Godsey, supra note 60, at 532; Jennifer Leavitt, Note, Walking a Tightrope: 
Balancing Competing Public Interests in the Employment of Criminal Offenders, 34 CONN. L. REV. 
1281, 1286 (2002). 
 65. See Freisthler & Godsey, supra note 60, at 532. 
 66. Id.; Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten 
Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1719 (2003). 
 67. Jeremy Travis et al., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., FROM PRISON TO HOME: THE 
DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY 32 (2001), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/from_prison_to_home.pdf. 
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estimated that the “wage penalty” of imprisonment is between 10% and 
20%.68  This result is not only attributable to the lack of skills and work 
experience that characterize the typical profile of many ex-offenders, it 
is also due to the stigmatization and legal employment restrictions that 
ex-offenders face.69 
As evidence of its commitment to the “tough on crime” stance in the 
1980s, the federal government and several states, implemented a number 
of occupational restrictions affecting ex-offenders.70  These restrictions 
have assumed the form of blanket prohibitions based on an individual’s 
status as a convicted felon.71  Unless an exception is made, individuals 
convicted of a felony are deemed ineligible to serve in any of the United 
States armed forces.72  Federal law enforcement officers convicted of 
felonies will be removed from service.73  And while the United States 
Constitution does not prohibit felons from holding public office,74 
various federal statutes provide for the removal of the individual from 
office upon conviction.75 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Pinard & Thompson, supra note 58, at 596.  See also Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. 
Williams, Making America “The Land of Second Chances”: Restoring Socioeconomic Rights for Ex-
Offenders, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 527, 532–38 (2006) (discussing state employment 
restrictions). 
 71. See Pinard & Thompson, supra note 58, at 596. 
 72. 10 U.S.C. § 504 (2006).  See also 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(m) (2006). 
 73. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7371, 8331(20) (2006).  “‘Law enforcement officer’ means an employee, the 
duties of whose position are primarily the investigation, apprehension, or detention of individuals 
suspected or convicted of offenses against the criminal laws of the United States, including an employee 
engaged in this activity who is transferred to a supervisory or administrative position.”  § 8331(20).  
“Law enforcement officer” also means: 
(A) an employee, the duties of whose position— 
(i) are primarily— 
(I) the investigation, apprehension, or detention of individuals suspected 
or convicted of offenses against the criminal laws of the United States, or 
(II) the protection of officials of the United States against threats to 
personal safety; and 
(ii) are sufficiently rigorous that employment opportunities should be limited to 
young and physically vigorous individuals, as determined by the Director 
considering the recommendations of the employing agency. 
5 U.S.C. § 8401(17) (2006). 
 74. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3; Id. art. II, § 1; Id. art. VI, cl. 3.  The Constitution provides that the 
“President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on 
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”  Id. 
art. II, § 4. 
 75. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2006) (providing that a conviction of treason bars an individual from 
“holding any office under the United States”); 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006) (providing that bribing a 
public official or accepting a bribe disqualifies an individual may be disqualified from holding federal 
12
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In addition, federal law bars certain classes of felons from working in 
institutions that are Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
insured76 and from working in the insurance industry without permission 
from an insurance regulatory official.77  Certain classes of felons are 
federally barred for a minimum of thirteen years after conviction from 
holding positions in a labor union or other organization that manages 
employee benefit plans.78  A federal statute disqualifies certain ex-
offenders from providing healthcare services where they will receive 
monies from Medicare.79 
Federal and state laws further decrease ex-offenders’ employment 
opportunities through occupational licensing laws.  Licensing 
restrictions result in the loss of new employment and act as a bar on 
reemployment in the occupation in which the offender was employed 
prior to conviction.80  Federal law provides for the suspension and 
revocation of numerous licenses including commercial motor vehicle 
operator licenses,81 pilot’s licenses (called airmen certificates),82 
hazardous materials equipment licenses (from local trash collectors to 
interstate trucking companies carrying nuclear waste),83 broadcasting 
licenses,84 and port workers transportation worker identification 
credential.85  This list is by no means exhaustive. 
Other federal and state license restrictions have been put forth as 
necessary “to foster high professional standards,” while limitations on 
employment opportunities are said to guarantee that those hired have 
“good moral character.”86  Suspensions and revocations placed on the 
licenses of commodity dealers,87 customs brokers,88 and SEC registrants 
office); 5 U.S.C. § 7313 (2006) (removes from federal or District of Columbia office and also 
disqualifies from employment in the United States or the District of Columbia for five years upon 
conviction of inciting, organizing, encouraging, or participating in, a riot or civil disorder or any offense 
committed in furtherance of, or while participating in, a riot or civil disorder). 
 76. 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (2006). 
 77. 18 U.S.C. § 1033(e)(1)(A), (2) (2006). 
 78. 29 U.S.C. §§ 504, 1111 (2006). 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2006). 
 80. Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45 B.C. L. 
REV. 225, 282 (2004). 
 81. 49 U.S.C. § 31310 (2006) (provides for a one time reinstatement for some offenses after ten 
years). 
 82. 49 U.S.C. § 44710 (2006); 14 C.F.R. § 61.15 (2010). 
 83. 49 U.S.C. § 5103a (2006). 
 84. 47 C.F.R. § 73.4280 (2010). 
 85. 46 U.S.C. § 70105 (2006), 49 C.F.R. §§ 1515.7, 1572.103 (2010). 
 86. Demleitner, supra note 59, at 156. 
 87. 7 U.S.C. § 12a(2) (2006). 
 88. 19 U.S.C. § 1641 (2006). 
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(brokers and dealers)89 are examples where “good moral character” 
comes into play.  In all of the above mentioned statutes and regulations, 
criminal background checks are conducted and a conviction becomes a 
statutory basis for denial.  Thus, if a new releasee convicted of drug 
possession wanted to return to work as the local trash collector, he 
would be prevented from doing so as his license was revoked upon 
conviction. 
One of the most common problems associated with access to work is 
the employer’s unwillingness to hire an individual with a criminal 
conviction.  Various studies conducted over the past fifteen years 
consistently show that on average 60% of employers indicate that they 
would “probably not” or “definitely not” consider hiring an individual 
with a criminal history.90  A study conducted by Devah Pager in 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin suggests that a criminal record reduces the 
likelihood of a callback by 50% depending on the race of the 
applicant.91  Overall reasons given for the automatic exclusion of ex-
offenders from the applicant pool include fears of theft, issues of 
physical safety, desire to avoid dealing with probation officers, and the 
risk of the employee reoffending.92  Employers note a distinction 
between non-violent and violent offenders and assert that such a 
difference is an important element in their decision.93  Inducements, 
 89. 15 U.S.C. 78o (2006). 
 90. DEVAH PAGER & BRUCE WESTERN, INVESTIGATING PRISONER REENTRY: THE IMPACT OF 
CONVICTION STATUS ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTS OF YOUNG MEN 20 (2009) (The study was 
conducted in New York City.  The study was an employment audit conducted with four male testers: 
two African-Americans and two whites.  The testers were paired by race; the two African-American 
testers formed one team and the two white testers formed the second team.  Within each team, one 
auditor was randomly assigned a “criminal record” for the first week; the pair rotated which member 
presented himself as the ex-offender for each successive week of employment searches, such that the 
tester served in the criminal record condition for an equal number of cases.  The criminal record 
consisted of a felony drug conviction (possession with intent to distribute cocaine) and eighteen months 
of served prison time.  The testers were to apply for real job openings in entry level positions to see 
whether employers respond differently to applications on the basis of selected characteristics.  The audit 
was subsequently followed by a telephone survey to employers for the investigative purposes.); Devah 
Pager & Lincoln Quillian, Walking the Talk? What Employers Say Versus What They Do, 70 AM. SOC. 
REV. 355, 363 (2005).  See also Devah Pager et al., Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A 
Field Experiment, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 363 (2005); Harry J. Holzer et al., Will Employers Hire Ex-
Offenders? Employer Preferences, Background Checks and Their Determinants, in IMPRISONING 
AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION 205 (Mary Patillo et al. eds., 2001) (The 
study was an employer survey conducted in 1993–1994 in four cities: Boston, Atlanta, Detroit, and Los 
Angeles finding exclusion rates of 60%.). 
 91. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 WIS. L. REV. 617 (2005) (The callback 
rate was 34% for whites with no criminal record, 17% for whites with a criminal record, 14% for 
African-Americans without a criminal record, and 5% for African-Americans with a criminal record.). 
 92. PAGER & WESTERN, supra note 90, at 23. 
 93. Id. 
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han anything 
el
s are following suit with similar legislation in 
Illinois and Kansas.99 
2. Disqualification from Federal Educational Assistance 
such as tax incentives and federal bonding, play a positive role in the 
hiring of releasees.94  Surprisingly, negligent hiring liability is not the 
primary concern for employers when deciding whether to hire an ex-
offender.95  A study published in 2009 found that the majority of 
employers are more concerned about behavioral problems t
se.96 
This “employment penalty” has developed into a major 
socioeconomic problem for entire communities.  Social organizations 
and advocacy groups across the country have been working with their 
municipal and state legislatures to “Ban the Box” on employment 
applications for work in public sector positions.97  Major cities, such as 
Boston and Chicago, have enacted rules requiring city employers to 
review an applicant’s qualifications prior to conducting a background 
check.98  Entire state
Under the Higher Education Amendments of 1998, individuals with 
minor drug convictions while receiving federal aid will be deemed 
ineligible for continued federal educational assistance.100  The 
amendments state that individuals convicted of drug-related offenses, 
state or federal, are disqualified from receiving federal student loans, 
grants or work study for varying time periods depending on the nature 
and number of convictions.101  For example, an individual convicted of 
first time possession of a controlled substance is ineligible to receive 
federal student assistance for one year from the date of conviction.102  A 
person convicted of a second offense for possession faces ineligibility 
 
 94. Id. at 29. 
 95. Id. at 28. 
 96. Id. at 23. 
 97. Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, Ban the Box, http://www.allofusornone.org/ 
campaigns/ban-the-box (last visited February 21, 2010) (Ban the Box is a national initiative aimed at 
prohibiting city and/or state employers from requesting information pertaining to criminal convictions 
g/docs/Hiring_Standards_ 
atrix
 Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1581 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. 
00
.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2006). 
on initial employment applications.). 
 98. SAFER FOUNDATIONS, RECENT LEGISLATION ESTABLISHING STANDARDS FOR HIRING 
PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS, available at http://www.saferfoundation.or
M _Final_(2).pdf (last visited February 21, 2010). 
 99. Id.  See H.R. Res. 107, 94th Leg. (Ill. 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4710 (2009). 
 100.
(2 0)). 
 101. 20 U
 102. Id. 
15
Silva: CLEAN SLATE: EXPANDING EXPUNGEMENTS AND PARDONS FOR NON-VIOLENT F
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011
SILVA FINAL FORMAT 2 2/11/2011  3:48:56 PM 
170 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
pt 
of
bstance while an additional 11,417 applicants 
left the question blank.106 
3. Issues in Housing 
survey, 66% would not accept an 
ap
for two years, and for a third time—“indefinite” ineligibility.103  A first 
offense of the sale of a controlled substance results in the ineligibility for 
two years with a subsequent offense resulting in indefinite 
ineligibility.104  The text of the statute does not link eligibility for recei
 federal assistance on any other offense, only drug related crimes.105 
State financial aid is typically linked to the federal requirements 
adding more exclusions and a layer of complexity.  This prevents 
thousands of potential students from financing their education.  In the 
2000–2001 academic year, over 65,000 applicants filing for federal 
student assistance indicated they had been convicted of either selling or 
possessing a controlled su
Criminal convictions, tarnished credit, and sparse employment are all 
common issues faced by ex-offenders.  They are also justifications for 
landlords and property managers to reject otherwise qualified applicants.  
A 2007 study examined landlords’ perspectives toward housing released 
offenders.107  The study showed that out of 611 landlord and property 
managers who participated in the 
plicant with a criminal history.108 
Securing public housing is another difficult challenge.  Changes in 
federal housing policy, particularly in the past fifteen years, have 
dramatically affected the ability of ex-offenders to obtain affordable 
housing.  In the same year Congress overhauled welfare legislation, it 
also tightened the rules governing government-backed housing 
subsidies.  Congress promulgated rules giving housing authorities great 
discretionary power to prohibit ex-offenders from securing § 8 vouchers 
and apartments in public housing projects.109  Under the Housing 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Dan Curry, U.S. May Relax Ban on Aid for Those with Drug Convictions, CHRONICLE OF 
HIGHER EDU., Sept. 7, 2001, http://chronicle.com/article/US-May-Relax-Ban-on-Aid-for/20048. 
k, Landlord Attitudes Toward Renting to Released Offender, 71 FED. 
RO
sections of 12 and 42 U.S.C. (2006)); Veteran Affairs and Hud 
pp
(3), (4) (2010). 
 107. Lynn M. Clar
P BATION 20 (2007). 
 108. Id. at 22. 
 109. Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-120, 110 Stat. 834 
(codified as amended in scattered 
A ropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2461 (1998); 42 U.S.C. § 13663(a) (2006); 24 
C.F.R. § 960.204(a)
16
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c housing agency employees” for a 
“r
n under 
y cause landlords to decline ex-offenders’ 
ap
Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996110 and the Quality Housing 
and Work Responsibility Act of 1998,111 an ex-offender faces a lifetime 
ban on receiving § 8 and other federally subsidized housing, if any 
member of the household is required to register with the state as a sex 
offender or has been convicted of production of methamphetamine on 
public housing grounds.112  Moreover, local housing authorities may 
refuse housing to individuals who have “engaged in any drug-related or 
violent criminal activity or other activity which would adversely affect 
the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by 
other residents, the owner, or publi
easonable time.”113  Furthermore, 
any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful 
enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related criminal 
activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, 
any member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other perso
the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy.114 
This language in effect permits housing authorities to evict residents on 
the basis of a drug arrest on or off the premises of any individual in the 
household.115  This strict liability punishment for third party actions has 
been upheld by the Supreme Court in HUD v. Rucker.116  These new 
regulations typicall
plications.117 
These federal policies are severe, resulting in the punishment of entire 
family units for the past criminal behaviors of a single member of the 
household.  Families of formerly imprisoned individuals “find it nearly 
impossible” to reunify with their fathers, mothers, and children without 
 
 110. Pub. L. No. 104-120, 110 Stat. 834 (1996) (codified as amended in scatter sections of 12 and 
42 U.S.C. (2000)). 
 111. Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2518 (1998). 
ine on the premises of 
.S.C. § 13661(c) (2006); 24 C.F.R. § 906.203(c) (2010) (providing that in screening 
her Mele, The Civil Threat of Eviction, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE 
OL
 112. 42 U.S.C. § 13663(a) (2006) (registered sex offenders); 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(a)(3), (4) (2010) 
(registered sex offenders and those convicted of manufacturing methamphetam
federally-assisted housing). 
 113. 42 U
applicants, public housing authorities may consider “all relevant information”). 
 114. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2006). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 127–28 (2002); Christopher Mele, 
The Civil Threat of Eviction, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS 
IMPRISONMENT, supra note 21. 
 117. See Christop
C LATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT, supra note 21, at 25.  Data is not currently 
available on the denial of applicants to Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
administered programs. 
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 units and the penalization of household members 
without convictions. 
4. Lifetime Ban on TANF and Food Stamps 
 
irect and often negative impact on the ex-
of
minimal cash assistance at the very moment he 
would most need it. 
5. Disenfranchisement 
 
potentially endangering their subsidies.118  The regulations’ effects are 
the fracturing of family
In 1996, Congress systematically dismantled welfare in the United 
States, in effect poking large holes in the socioeconomic safety net for 
ex-offenders and the families who rely on them.119  Through a series of 
legislative initiatives, Congress enacted laws that imposed restrictions 
based on felony convictions on receipt of cash benefits and food stamps. 
These restrictions have a d
fender and his family.120 
Under the Clinton Administration, the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, 
entitled the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), terminated individual entitlements and 
replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with block 
grants known as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).121  
TANF provides cash assistance to needy families to meet life’s basic 
requirements while the food stamp program provides low income 
families with a way to obtain foodstuffs.122  The 1996 change provided 
that an individual convicted of a federal or state felony offense involving 
the use or sale of drugs is subject to a lifetime ban on food stamps and 
cash assistance.123  Thus, a newly released ex-offender is barred from 
receiving food and 
Christopher Uggen and Jeff Manza estimate that approximately 4.7 
million adults were legally disenfranchised by virtue of conviction in 
 118. Gwen Rubinstein & Debbie Mukamal, Welfare and Housing—Denial of Benefits to Drug 
Offenders, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATER L CONSEQUENCES OF MASS I PRISONMENT, 
supra note 21, at 37, 48. 
 119. PATRICIA ALLARD, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE S
A M
ENTENCES: DENYING WELFARE 
 DRUG OFFENSES 10–14 (2002), available at 
e/articles_publications/publications/lifesentences/03-18-
ote 70, at 541. 
542. 
BENEFITS TO WOMEN CONVICTED OF
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/baltimor
03atriciaAllardReport.pdf; Archer & Williams, supra n
 120. Demleitner, supra note 59, at 158. 
 121. Travis, supra note 21, at 23. 
 122. Archer & Williams, supra note 70, at 
 123. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 8, 21, 25, and 42 U.S.C., § 115(a) 
(2006); codified at 21 U.S.C. § 862a(a) (2006)). 
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more salient, and perhaps 
a d
2000.124  Three-fourths of this population were either under community 
supervision or had completed their sentence but were still 
disenfranchised by state statute.125  Individuals charged with 
misdemeanor crimes currently incarcerated and awaiting trial are also 
“practically disenfranchised” in that they retain the legal right to vote 
but are denied access to the polls on Election Day.126  This phenomenon 
impacts racial minorities more severely.  One study estimated that 13% 
of African-American males are disenfranchised due to a felony 
conviction and that in 2000 over 10% of the African-American voting 
population was disenfranchised in fifteen states.127  Disenfranchised 
felons comprise more than 2% of the voting age population and four of 
the last eleven presidential elections were won by a 1.1% margin of 
victory.128  Felon disenfranchisement may be 
ecisive, factor in future presidential races.129 
Constitutional challenges to felon disenfranchisement have been 
unsuccessful following the Supreme Court’s decision in Richardson v. 
Ramirez.130  In Richardson, the Court ruled that felon 
disenfranchisement is not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.131  It reasoned that § 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment appears to explicitly allow limitations on voting due to a 
criminal conviction.132  The constitutional text calls for 
disenfranchisement for participation “in rebellion or other crimes.”133  
However, a recent circuit challenge, decided in 2008, seems to have 
reignited the debate by focusing on the statutory requirements of the 
Voting Rights Act.134  In Farrakhan v. Gregoire, the Ninth Circuit ruled 
 
 124. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Disenfranchisement and the Civic Reintegration of 
isement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777 (2002); Brian 
stopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Disenfranchisement and the Civic Reintegration of 
IVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 21, at 71. 
 
ardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1976). 
Convicted Felons, in CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 21, at 67 (They predicted 
that the Democrats would have gained parity in the U.S. Senate in 1984 and would have maintained 
control of the Senate from 1986 to the present.  Furthermore, they predicted that had the rate of felon 
disenfranchisement been the same as it is today during 1960, John F. Kennedy’s election would have 
been jeopardized.).  See also Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political 
Consequences of Felon Disenfranch
Pinaire et al., Barred From the Vote: Public Attitudes Toward the Disenfranchisement of Felons, 30 
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1519 (2003). 
 125. Chri
Convicted Felons, in C
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 72.
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Rich
 131. Id. at 56. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 134. Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 590 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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 § 2 
of
y Carter and 
Gerald Ford, advocated for the restoration of voting rights to ex-
offenders who had fully comp tences.136 
ity to obtain housing keeps families apart.  The cycle 
pe
only branch of 
government that has the authority to create a system with the 
wherew
that the state of Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law violated
 the Voting Rights Act.135  It has been considered a small victory for 
ex-offenders and advocates on the voting disenfranchisement front. 
While it is clear that further research is needed to connect civic 
reintegration with a reduction in recidivism, a great deal has already 
been done to make a case for abandoning statutes barring ex-offenders 
from participating in the political process.  In 2001, the National 
Commission on Federal Election Reform, headed by Jimm
leted their sen
D. Summary 
Today, in America, a felony conviction costs.  It costs taxpayers in 
the form of expenditures supporting various penal departments.  It costs 
the ex-offender socioeconomic and political opportunity.  It also costs 
American society in the form of human capital and progression, 
individual talent, and community strength.  The picture created from the 
recidivism research conducted by the BOP shows that employment is 
vital to the success of the releasee.  Yet, most employers are unlikely to 
hire an individual with a criminal record.  The research also shows that 
education and family support play key roles in keeping an ex-offender 
out of prison.  However, the federal government will not provide 
educational assistance to individuals convicted of drug offenses and ex-
offenders’ inabil
rpetuates itself causing desperation, reoffending, and ultimately a 
return to prison. 
Federal offenders are in a particularly precarious position as they have 
no realistic remedy available to them to combat these obstacles.  
Presidential pardons are merely symbolic and judicial petitions for 
expungement are almost non-existent.  Congress is the 
ithal to break the cycle that it in essence created. 
III. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
This Part describes the two existing post-conviction remedies in the 
 
 135. Id. at 1016 (The court further found that Plaintiffs met their summary judgment burden of 
proving that the discriminatory impact of the disenfranchisement law was attributable to racial 
discrimination in the Washington criminal justice system.). 
 136. NAT’L COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE 
ELECTORAL PROCESS (2001). 
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 whether federal 
courts have the requisite jurisdiction to hear petitions for expungements.  
The federal circuits rem .  Congress is the only 
branch of government with the authority ent a viable federal 
pr
two branches of 
government by flagging harsh and inflexible criminal statutes and by 
challenging outcomes of crim .140  Despite the enormous 
authority conferred upon the President, become 
in
federal system—the presidential pardoning power and federal judicial 
expungements—and shows why both are inadequate to address the 
numerous collateral consequences faced by today’s federal ex-offender.  
It is unclear whether the pardoning power could constitutionally 
expunge a criminal conviction.  It is also uncertain
ain divided on the issue
 to implem
ogram aimed at combating collateral consequences. 
A. Presidential Pardon 
The President shall . . . have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for 
Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.137 
The power to pardon is one of the greatest and most unbridled powers 
enumerated in the text of the United States Constitution.  There are no 
constitutional textual restrictions and neither of the two other branches 
may check the President in the use of this power.138  The power itself is 
also regarded as one of the most benevolent powers of our chief 
executive, bestowing mercy and forgiveness on those to whom it is 
granted.139  Actual utilization of the power speaks to the American 
tradition of separation of powers as well as checks and balances.  While 
pardons were not designed to achieve any sort of systematic criminal 
justice reform, they do serve as a check on the other 
inal cases
 the pardoning power has 
creasingly underutilized, particularly in recent years. 
 
 137. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 138. Id.  See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833) (asserting that the power to 
pardon is the private and official act of the President); Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 
86
uality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 
9 
s: Reflections on the 
HAM URB. L.J. 1483, 1506–08 (2000). 
(1 6) (asserting that the presidential pardoning power is not subject to legislative controls). 
 139. Wilson, 32 U.S. at 159–60 (“A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power 
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed, from the 
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed”); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 311 
(1855) (stating that a pardon is “forgiveness, release, remission”).  See also William F. Duker, The 
President’s Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475 (1977); Daniel T. 
Kobil, The Q
56 (1991). 
 140. Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics, and Collar Button
President’s Duty To Be Merciful, 27 FORD
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1. Origins 
The earliest account of pardons is found in the ancient Greek city-
state of Athens.141  Although not highly developed, pardons existed.  
However, in Athens the power rested with the people.142  The process 
was quite difficult and typically depended on popularity rather than 
concerns of justice or mercy.143 
The power to pardon eventually manifested itself in England; first in 
the English Crown and ultimately in the hands of Parliament.144  In 
England, pardons were the exclusive legal remedy of justice for those 
individuals whose punishment was questionable due to infancy, 
incapacity, etc.145  Pardons were also used as a tool of conscription, by 
which the King would pardon outlaws in exchange for service in the 
royal military.146  In 1535, King Henry VIII consolidated the power to 
pardon in the Crown.147  This power was absolute and remained so for 
165 years until a constitutional crisis forced the English to rethink the 
authority given to the King.148 
England began its colonization of North America in 1585.  American 
Colonists of the new world took with them English ideas, laws, and 
systems of governance.  This included the clemency power, which the 
King delegated to his direct representatives in the New World.149  The 
royal charters for each of the colonies expressly committed the power to 
pardon to the executive of each colony.150  However, the American 
Revolution brought with it distrust of executive authority as well as an 
end to executive clemency.151  With this, most states placed the 
authority in the hands of the legislature.152 
 141. Kobil, supra note 139, at 583. 
Those individuals who were not athletes or celebrities had incredible difficulty 
lly killed a younger child 
accidentally pushing him into a cauldron of hot water). 
uker, supra note 139, at 493. 
e, but this power could only be exercised in the presence of 
sistant governors.). 
t 590. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 584 (An individual petitioning for a pardon was required to obtain the support of 6,000 
citizens in a secret poll.  
obtaining such support). 
 144. Id. at 586; Duker, supra note 139, at 475–87. 
 145. Duker, supra note 139, at 479 (describing the case of four-year-old Katherine Pesscavant 
who was imprisoned in the abbot of St. Alban’s gaol because she unintentiona
by opening a door and 
 146. Id. at 478. 
 147. Kobil, supra note 139, at 586; D
 148. Duker, supra note 139, at 487. 
 149. Kobil, supra note 139, at 589. 
 150. Id. (The charters of Virginia, Massachusetts Bay, Maine, Maryland, Georgia, Pennsylvania, 
the Carolinas and New Jersey gave the power directly to the governors.  Rhode Island, Connecticut, and 
Providence gave the power to the legislatur
the governor and six as
 151. Id. a
 152. Id. 
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e, similar to the 
En s 
ne 4  
In 
uld be most ready to 
 to understand 
the necessity of mitigation in the case of severe laws.  His argument won 
and the Constitution was n states in 1787 with the 
power being consolidated solely 157 
warrants were granted.   The percentage of pardons granted remained 
During the revolutionary years, Alexander Hamilton, advocated for 
the consolidation of the power in one Chief Executiv
glish model.153  Both he and James Iredell argued that the power wa
cessary to ensure fairness, and it should be held by only one man.15
Federalist No. 74, Alexander Hamilton argued that: 
The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary 
severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate 
guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.  As the 
sense of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as it is 
undivided, it may be inferred that a single man wo
attend to the force of those motives which might plead for a mitigation of 
the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to considerations which were 
calculated to shelter a fit object of its vengeance.155 
In Hamilton’s opinion, the pardoning power was necessary to protect 
against a potentially harsh criminal code.156  For him, one man would be 
less likely to give in to political pressure and more likely
ratified by the thirtee
 in the President.
2. American Trends 
Throughout this country’s history, the pardoning power has been used 
for a variety of purposes, including calming and unifying the country 
during times of rebellion and political strife, commuting prison 
sentences from death to life in prison, and rewarding ex-offenders for 
rehabilitation and a commitment to a law-abiding life.158  Between 1928 
and 1980, before the advent and expansion of collateral consequences, 
there were at least one hundred post-conviction presidential pardons 
granted almost every year.159  In most years, the President granted more 
than one hundred petitions.160  In other years, over 300 separate pardon 
161
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton). 
tial Clemency by Administration: 1900 to 1945 and 
rney, supra note 
59.
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Love, supra note 140, at 1487. 
 159. Office of the Pardon Attorney, Presiden
1945 to present, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/statistics.htm (last visited February 21, 2010). 
 160. Id.; Love, supra note 140, at 1491–92. 
 161. In 1950, President Truman granted 400 petitions.  Office of the Pardon Atto
1   President Franklin Roosevelt signed well over 2,500 separate pardon warrants and commuted well 
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mmy Carter.   The number of pardons 
gr
 
high through these years in every presidential administration beginning 
with F.D.R. and ending with Ji 162
anted signified that the utilization of the power was considered a 
customary presidential duty.163 
Something peculiar happened during the Reagan Administration.  
During his presidency, the number of pardons dropped significantly.  
Reagan pardoned a total of 393 individuals in his two terms, which is 
less than half of the number of individuals pardoned by Jimmy Carter in 
his four years as President.164  George H.W. Bush’s grant rate was 
lowest for any twentieth century president—seventy-four pardons 
granted during his tenure in office.165  Some may argue that the 
dwindling number of pardons is actually a prudent use of the power.  
over 400 sentences during his tenure as President.  Love, supra note 140, at 1491 n.32. 
 162. Office of the Pardon Attorney, supra note 159.  This source further provides the following 
data on pardons: 
 
President No. of Pardons 
McKinley (1897–1901) 291 
Roosevelt (1901–1909) 668 
Taft (1909–1913) 383 
Wilson (1913–1921) 1087 
Harding (1921–1923) 300 
Coolidge (1923–1929) 773 
Hoover (1929–1933) 672 
FDR (1933–1945) 2799 
Truman (1945–1953) 1913 
Eisenhower (1953–1961) 1110 
JFK (1961–1964) 472 
LBJ (1964–1969) 960 
Nixon (1969–1975) 863 
Ford (1975–1977) 382 
Carter (1977–1981) 534 
 
 163. Love, supra note 140, at 1493. 
 164. Id. at 1494. 
 165. Office of the Pardon Attorney, supra note 159.  This source provides the following data on 
pardons: 
 
President No. of Pardons 
Reagan (1981–1989) 393 
George H.W. Bush (1989–1993) 74 
Clinton (1993–2001) 396 
George W. Bush (2001–2009) 189 
Obama (2009–2010) 0 
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emency 
power.   Over time, the standards used for granting clemency became 
higher resulting in the n ted becoming lower.168  
The number of cases recomm the White House for 
fav
onstitution fails to give any definition or meaning to the term.  
Early on, the United States Supreme Court delineated the legal scope of 
a pardon in a handful  develop into a clear 
characterization leaving lower courts  the legal effect of a 
pa
nt 
r 
wa d 
Sta
m the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from 
private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the 
individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated 
This argument fails to appreciate the severity and harshness of collateral 
consequences in today’s world on non-violent federal offenders.  It also 
assumes that all offenders are equally dangerous and undesirable. 
Since the 1980s, both parties have competed in the “race to 
incarcerate” that proliferated with the War on Drugs.  The “race to 
incarcerate” exponentially increased the national prison population.  It 
also saw Congress and state legislatures enact an expansive web of 
penalties disqualifying individuals based solely on conviction.  During 
this time, the practice of pardoning became devalued when the Attorney 
General delegated his authority to approve clemency applications to 
subordinate officials in the Department of Justice, known today as 
Pardon Attorneys.166  These attorneys reflected the perspectives of 
prosecutors and may not have had a clear understanding of the cl
167
umber of petitions gran
ended and sent to 
orable consideration has correspondingly dropped as well.169 
3. Meaning and Effect 
What does it mean to be pardoned?  What is its legal effect?  The text 
of the C
 of opinions, but this failed to
to determine
rdon. 
a. Supreme Court Precede
One of the original cases discussing the presidential pardoning powe
s a decision by the Marshall Court in 1833.170  In the case of Unite
tes v. Wilson, the Court defined a pardon as: 
an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution 
of the laws, which exe pts 
the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.  It is the 
 
 166. Love, supra note 140, at 1496. 
es v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 1497. 
 170. United Stat
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pt to require 
al
he 
Co s 
a c
 to its operation: it does not restore offices 
 
officially to the court.171 
In 1866, Justice Field articulated for the majority the effect of a 
pardon in Ex Parte Garland.172  In that case, the Court struck down an 
1865 Act of Congress requiring attorneys of the federal bar to take an 
oath affirming they never voluntarily bore arms against the United States 
or engaged, assisted, or taken office in a “pretended authority in hostility 
to the United States.”173  The Act was a clear attem
legiance to the United States from the Confederate bar.  Those who 
refused the oath were barred from practicing.174 
The petitioner, Attorney A.H. Garland was an Arkansas lawyer and 
politician who served as Senator in both the United States and 
Confederate Congress and was granted a full pardon after the war of 
secession.175  Garland petitioned the court to continue to practice as an 
attorney without taking the oath.176  He argued the act of Congress was 
unconstitutional and that even if it were deemed constitutional, he was 
released from the requirement by the pardon of the President.177  T
urt ruled in favor of Garland finding that a pardon theoretically erase
onviction.  The Court laid out the legal effect of a pardon, writing: 
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and the 
guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the 
punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the 
law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence.  
If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and 
disabilities consequent upon conviction from attaching; if granted after 
conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to 
all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a 
new credit and capacity. 
 There is only this limitation
forfeited, or property or interests vested in others in consequence of the 
conviction and judgment.178 
 The Garland dissent conceded that a pardon relieves the petitioner 
from “all the punishment which the law inflicted for his offence.”179  
This suggests a uniform understanding among the Justices of the legal 
 171. Id. at 160. 
 172. Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). 
 173. Id. at 334–36. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 336–37. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 381–82. 
 179. Id. at 396 (Miller, J., dissenting). 
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d capacity” and “rehabilitates him to the 
ex
ilt” is inherent in a pardon.   This 
ph
ed a full and 
un
officially absolved of any consequence of any criminal act.   Burdick 
effect of a pardon granted post-conviction.  Ultimately, the Court 
determined that the 1865 Act was unconstitutional and that it was 
beyond the constitutional authority of Congress to impose punishment 
outside the reach of executive clemency.180  Garland was now permitted 
to practice and was reborn as a “new man” with “new credit and 
capacity” going on to become the Attorney General of the United States 
in the first Cleveland administration.181  The effect given to pardons by 
the Court in Garland was further doctrinally entrenched with the case of 
Knote v. United States, where the Court held that while a pardon gives 
an individual a “new credit an
tent in his former position,” it did not restore confiscated property that 
was sold to a third party, where those third party rights have vested.182  
These cases remain good law. 
However, in the 1915 case of Burdick v. United States, the Court 
handed down an opinion that has since complicated the understood 
effect of a pardon.183  Justice McKenna, writing for the majority, 
asserted that an “imputation of gu 184
rase has been interpreted by lower federal courts to stand for the 
proposition that a pardon does not have the far reaching effect of 
blotting out the existence of guilt. 
In Burdick, a judgment of contempt was levied against the defendant 
a New York Tribune editor, for his refusal to turnover his source to 
prosecutors concerning articles published in the newspaper.185  Claiming 
that his answers might incriminate him, Burdick refused to comply.186  
He was ordered to return later that day where he was hand
conditional pardon, signed by President Woodrow Wilson.187  He was 
188
 
 180. Id. at 381. 
 181. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 182. Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153–54 (1877).  The Court was asked to consider 
whether the general pardon and amnesty granted by President Johnson following the civil war entitled 
an individual to compensation for loss of property previously confiscated and sold and after such 
proceeds were paid into the United States treasury pursuant to the confiscation act of 1862.  Justice 
Fields, writing for the majority, asserted that a pardon, “[i]n contemplation of law, it so far blots out the 
offence, that afterwards it cannot be imputed to him to prevent the assertion of his legal rights.”  Id. at 
153.  However, property confiscated and vested in a third party is not recoverable because the individual 
as ot vest in a third party.  Id. at. 154. 
 United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915). 
the securing, writing about, or assisting in the publication of” the articles in the 
ew
w granted a pardon unless the proceeds or property did n
 183. Burdick v.
 184. Id. at 94. 
 185. Id. at 85. 
 186. Id. at 85. 
 187. Id.  The pardon was for all offenses he “has committed or may have committed, or taken part 
in, in connection with 
n spaper.  Id. at 86. 
 188. Id. at 85. 
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 asserted that 
th
ocal language 
in Ex Parte Garland.  This has had major implications in determining 
the legal effect a pardon has on post-conviction penalties. 
nge a criminal history?  Will a former felon 
sti
 
refused to accept the pardon and remained in contempt.189 
The Court was asked to review the judgment and in doing so 
answered two constitutional questions: (1) whether the President has the 
power to pardon before conviction of an offense and (2) whether it is 
necessary for the grantee to “accept” the pardon in order for it to have 
full legal effect.190  The Court answered both questions in the 
affirmative.191  In answering the second question, the Court
e grantee’s acceptance of a pardon admits guilt.192  The grantee 
“confess[es] his guilt in order to avoid conviction of it.”193 
The Court did not go farther than discussing the offer and acceptance 
theory underlying pre-conviction pardons.  However, some lower courts 
have used the language in Burdick to diminish the unequiv
b. Lower Courts 
While Ex Parte Garland remains good law, lower federal courts have 
used the language in Burdick to interpret the legal effect of a pardon 
today.  The two cases, taken together, leave some questions open.  For 
example, does a pardon expu
ll be required to admit his conviction to the general public once 
pardoned by the President? 
While the Supreme Court has yet to rule on these issues, some lower 
courts have determined that a pardon does not expunge the record of 
conviction and ex-offenders are required to admit convictions when 
asked despite being granted a pardon.194  The 1990 Third Circuit case of 
United States v. Noonan called into question the effect a pardon has on 
an individual’s criminal record.195  Noonan was convicted of draft 
violations and pardoned by President Carter.196  He requested a court 
order stating that his pardon had the effect of expunging his criminal 
 189. Id. at 87. 
t 94. 
d 1035, 1036 (9th Cir. 
009 don does not constitute an expungement”). 
2d at 952. 
4. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id.a
 193. Id. 
 194. United States v. Noonan, 906 F.2d 952 (3d Cir. 1990) (Aldisert, J., reasoning that a grant of a 
pardon does not wipe out the conviction); Hirschberg v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 414 F.3d 
679 (7th Cir. 2005) (Kanne, J., asserting that the modern case law and the historical language in Ex 
Parte Garland are inconsistent with current law); United States v. Bays, 539 F.3
2 ) (Tallman, J., holding that a “par
 195. Noonan, 906 F.
 196. Id. at 953–5
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aves the record of conviction untouched.   For the Third 
Ci
ourt offers a holding based on the laws of 
Britain, in essence stripping the pardoning power of its intended 
 
convictions.197  Framing the issue as a question of separation of powers, 
the court asked whether the executive power to pardon permits the 
President to directly or indirectly expunge a judicial branch record.198  
The Third Circuit determined that it does not.199  Relying heavily on 
Burdick, Samuel Williston’s Harvard Law Review exposé on pardons,200 
and the historical evolution of the power in England, the Noonan court 
asserted a pardon does not “blot out guilt” nor does it restore an 
individual to a state of innocence before the eyes of the law.201  There is 
an “imputation of guilt” in the acceptance of a pardon.202  A pardon 
therefore le 203
rcuit, a pardon is nothing more than “an executive prerogative of 
mercy.”204 
The Noonan holding has been adopted by many sister circuits and 
appears to be the dominant trend throughout the country.205  The Third 
Circuit’s reasoning dismisses the doctrinal and historical significance of 
the strong language in both Wilson and Ex Parte Garland.  It instead 
opts for the language in Burdick, a case regarding the pre-conviction 
pardoning authority of the President and having nothing to do with the 
legal effect of post-conviction pardons.  The Noonan court also ignores 
the distinctiveness of American traditions focusing instead on English 
customs.  Rather than investigating the intent of the American Framers, 
Noonan quotes Blackstone and British case law.206  Moreover, the Third 
Circuit completely ignores the many severe collateral consequences of 
conviction.  The Noonan c
 197. Id. at 954. 
 198. Id. at 955. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Samuel Williston, Does A Pardon Blot Out Guilt?, 28 HARV. L. REV. 648, 653 (1915) 
(recognizing that while a pardon does remove civil disabilities associated with conviction, it does not 
change the character of a pardoned convict, and where character is a qualification for office an offence 
(whether pardoned or unpardoned) demonstrates the lack of that qualification). 
 201. Noonan, 906 F.2d at 958. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 955. 
 205. See United States v. Bays, 589 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2009) (determining that the Idaho 
constitutional statute authorizing pardons did not specifically state that the underlying conviction is 
erased from the defendant’s criminal record despite the Idaho Supreme Court’s pronouncement that a 
pardon “does away with both the punishment and the effects of guilt”); Hirschberg v. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n, 414 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2005) (reasoning that the pardon clause was not 
violated when the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFMC) took into consideration the 
underlying conduct in an insurance fraud scheme that resulted in a felony fraud conviction and 
subsequently denied his application to reinstatement as a floor broker). 
 206. Noonan, 906 F.2d at 959–60. 
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American exceptionali
n 
rel 0  
Ho
o atically 
expunge the records; it would be the President’s separate expungement 
order that would require admi ies to take action.211 
Office of Legal Counsel determined that although not 
au
power and determined that the power was safer in the hands of one man 
sm. 
c. Office of Legal Counsel 
In August 2006, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel 
provided the United States Pardon Attorney with a Memorandum 
Opinion regarding whether a presidential pardon expunges judicial and 
executive branch records of crime.207  The office concluded that 
expungement is not automatic.208  It reasoned that Ex Parte Garland has 
not been literally applied and that the United States Supreme Court has 
appeared to back away from the language in that case.209  The opinio
ied heavily on Noonan, quoting numerous passages as support.21
wever, the opinion came full circle and concluded that: 
If a President chose simultaneously to issue a pardon and order the 
Executive Branch to expunge any such records, we believe that order 
would have the effect intended, subject to any statutory constraints on 
executive record keeping. . . . [T]he pardon would not aut m
nistrative agenc
4. Relevance 
If a pardon does not in effect expunge the conviction, then what is its 
function and how does it help?  The current state of the law shows that 
the courts and the executive are ever more confused about the legal 
effects of a pardon.  The courts have contradicted years of doctrinal 
support for the notion that a presidential pardon offers a clean slate and 
determined that a pardon does not expunge the record of conviction.  
However, the 
tomatic, a pardon has the ability to require expungement if ordered by 
the President. 
While there is a legitimate argument that presidential pardons are 
subject to abuses including political influences, abuse of discretion, and 
abuse of power, there are equally valid historical and textual arguments.  
It could be argued that the Framers contemplated potential abuses of the 
 
 207. Whether Presidential Pardon Expunges Judicial and Executive Branch Records of a Crime, 
 sel (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2006/pardonopfinal.pdf. 
t 3–5. 
Op. Off. Legal Coun
 208. Id. at 6. 
 209. Id. a
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 6. 
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the power, unchecked, and 
co
ower is to create a class of 
legislatively sanctioned expungements. 
B. Judicial Petitions for Expungement 
nt depends largely on 
the federal circuit in which the conviction stands. 
1. Jurisdiction 
e jurisdiction to hear petitions for judicial expungement?  It 
de
instead of in the hands of the popular sentiment.212  The text of the 
Constitution reflects this intent, explicitly allowing for unlimited 
exercise (except in cases of impeachment) of 
mpletely at the discretion of the President. 
Thus far, despite a federal pardon, a felony conviction still stands.  
Practically speaking a presidential pardon has no legal significance on 
collateral consequences.  Today a man granted a pardon is not a “new 
man” with “new credit and capacity.”  The existence of his guilt is 
recorded in a criminal history resulting in continual punishment for the 
underlying offense.  Today’s pardoned ex-offenders, although not 
convicted of treason, are not afforded the same treatment as Garland.  
Instead, the stain of conviction remains.  One way to correct for the 
doctrinal narrowing of the pardon p
While there is nominal, federal statutory authority permitting 
legislative expungements, some federal courts have determined that they 
have constitutional authority to grant judicial petitions for expungement.  
In fact, federal courts have granted petitions for expungement in 
“appropriate” cases such as where a defendant was arrested without the 
requisite probable cause213 and where arrests were made for the 
deliberate purpose of interfering with the right to vote.214  A federal ex-
offender’s ability to obtain a judicial expungeme
To expunge a federal conviction, an ex-offender must move to be 
heard in the federal district court where the conviction stands.215  The 
district judge will then decide whether the matter will go forward.  As 
with all cases, the judge must make a preliminary determination 
regarding whether the requisite jurisdiction to proceed to the merits 
exists.  It is on this point that the federal circuits are split: Do the federal 
courts hav
pends. 
 
 212. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 213. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 214. United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967). 
 215. This information was obtained by a criminal court clerk in the Northern District of Illinois on 
February 22, 2010.  There is no formal procedure to be heard on an expungement matter. 
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ed States.”   However, it is generally 
ac
expungement petitions.  
Ho
finding jurisdiction while the First, Third, Eighth, and Ninth do not.   
The circuit courts differ in their approach.  There is currently no 
federal statute granting district courts the general authority to expunge 
federal records of conviction solely on equitable grounds.  There has 
been some controversy surrounding the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231 stating, that “district courts of the United States shall have 
original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses 
against the laws of the Unit 216
cepted that § 3231 does not permit equitable jurisdiction over petitions 
for criminal expungement.217 
Typical congressional grants of equitable jurisdiction are narrow and 
very specific.  Federal statutes authorizing federal courts to grant 
expungements in equity include the Civil Rights Act,218 habeas corpus 
statutes,219 and, under the All Writs Act, a writ of error coram nobis220 
to name a few.  Under these statutes, district courts have been 
specifically granted jurisdiction to hear 
wever, if a case does not fall within a statutory grant of jurisdiction, 
some courts have found a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.221 
The circuits that have established the jurisdictional requirement to 
entertain expungement petitions do so through use of their “inherent” 
equitable power.  The circuit courts are almost evenly split on the issue 
of jurisdiction with the Second, D.C., Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits 
222
 
 216. United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000). 
5 (2006). 
2006). 
t Court does not have the jurisdiction to expunge a criminal record, even when 
005, 1014 (9th 
 217. Id. 
 218. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1983, 198
 219. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255 (
 220. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006). 
 221. United States v. Dunegan, 251 F.3d 477, 480 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Thus, we hold that in absence 
of any applicable statute enacted by Congress, or an allegation that the criminal proceedings were 
invalid or illegal, a Distric
ending in an acquittal.”). 
 222. Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need for Federal Expungement 
Legislation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 29–30 (2008).  See United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 539 
(2d Cir. 1977) (finding equitable jurisdiction to hear petitions for expungement); Menard v. Saxbe, 498 
F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“The judicial remedy of expungement is inherent and is not 
dependent on express statutory provision . . . . ”); Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee, 130 F.3d 695, 
697 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that the court has supervisory powers over judicial records); United States v. 
Janik, 10 F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cir. 1993) (asserting that the court has authority to expunge judicial 
records); United States v. Pinto, 1 F.3d 1069, 1070 (10th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that authority to 
expunge is found in the court’s equitable power); United States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 
2007) (holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider defendant’s request for 
expungement on equitable grounds); United States v. Rowlands, 451 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(“[O]ur precedent clearly establishes that we have jurisdiction over petitions for expungement only 
when the validity of the underlying criminal proceeding is challenged.”); United States v. Meyer, 439 
F.3d 855, 859 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding lack of subject matter jurisdiction regarding expungement of 
criminal convictions solely on equitable grounds); United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1
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ixth, and Eleventh circuits have yet to affirmatively decide 
the issue.223 
a. Inherent Equitable Jurisdiction 
t constitutional grant, is used 
at 
surrounding the case call for the application of 
 
The Fourth, S
The circuit courts that have found jurisdiction put forth the doctrine of 
“inherent powers” as the basis for their authority.224  Within these 
inherent powers lies ancillary jurisdiction stemming from the court’s 
general power to oversee criminal prosecutions.225  Such authority is 
“incidental to the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over a cause under 
review.”226  The equitable power, an explici
the court’s discretion to apply justice.227 
The circuits that employ the inherent equitable power doctrine go to 
the merits of an expungement petition.  Typically the courts use a 
balancing test that weighs the petitioner’s interest in avoiding the harm 
that results from a conviction against the public’s interest in maintaining 
criminal records and promoting effective law enforcement.228  The 
Tenth Circuit has couched the petitioner’s interest in terms of 
“privacy.”229  These courts use the expungement power quite narrowly 
and have repeatedly asserted that an expungement will only be granted 
in an “exceptional circumstance.”230  The petitioner needs evidence 
demonstrating exceptional hardship due to the conviction or a showing 
that the circumstances 
Cir. 2000) (recognizing ancillary jurisdiction to expunge but not for equitable purposes). 
 223. United States v. Allen, 742 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying a request for expungement by an acquittee but failing to address 
jurisdictional issue); Thompson v. Rutherford County, Tenn., 318 F. App’x. 387, 388 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(majority asserting that “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not addressed the jurisdictional issue, and we need not 
eci
 
 to make law when 
67 F.2d at 536. 
end to all 
individual outweigh the public interest in maintenance of records, then 
d invasion of privacy which overrides the Government’s justification in keeping the 
d de it here”). 
 224. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d at 539; Livingtson v. Dep’t of Justice, 759 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1985); 
Janik, 10 F.3d at 472.  See also United States v. Doe, 556 F.2d 391, 393 (6th Cir. 1977); Mouzon, supra
note 222, at 23.  Inherent powers vest when the court is created and does not originate from any statute. 
 225. Mouzon, supra note 222, at 23.  See Soo Line R.R. v. Escanaba & Lake Superior R.R. Co., 
840 F.2d 546, 551 (7th Cir. 1988) (asserting that the court has inherent power
legislation does not address a particular topic); Schnitzer, 5
 226. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 86 (6th ed. 1990). 
 227. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  Clause 1 states, “[t]he judicial power shall ext
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States.”  Id. 
 228. Diamond v. United States, 649 F.2d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 1981) (“If the dangers of unwarranted 
adverse consequences to the 
expunction is appropriate.”). 
 229. United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925, 928 (10th Cir. 1975) (“There was no showing . . . that 
the retained records have been, or will be, used improperly or intrusively . . . . Thus, there is no 
demonstrate
records.”). 
 230. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d at 538. 
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fai
epresented “an unwarranted slur on his 
rep
rness and justice.231 
The “exceptional circumstances” test is not applied uniformly by the 
federal circuits.  Courts have yet to spell out a clear definition of what 
constitutes an “exceptional circumstance.”  The Sixth Circuit spoke 
when it affirmed a district court’s decision denying the petitioner an 
expungement where he was originally named in a federal civil suit and 
later dismissed as a defendant.232  While the Sixth Circuit has yet to 
affirmatively decide the jurisdictional issue, the court asserted that this 
scenario failed to meet the “exceptional circumstances” threshold that is 
used by some courts.233  However, in a similar Wisconsin district court 
case, an expungement of indictment and arrest records were ordered.234  
The defendant, an attorney, had a significant interest in maintaining a 
positive status.  The court employed the balancing test and found that 
the defendant’s interest in maintaining his reputation outweighed the 
government’s interest in law enforcement.235  Noting that the records 
were eleven years old, there was no opposition from the government, 
and there was no indication the defendant engaged in criminal activity, 
the court ordered the records expunged.236  The court asserted that the 
existence of such records r
utation and character.”237 
In a 2008 Utah district court case, an expungement was granted to a 
petitioner twenty years after the conviction.  The defendant graduated 
from college “with high marks,” got married, had three children with 
whom he was very involved, maintained steady employment “while 
excelling at the workplace,” and maintained a law-abiding life.238  The 
petitioner also received the blessing of the United States attorney and 
provided the court with his company’s policy stating he would not 
 
 231. United States v. Holmes, No. MC19990106MDG2005, 2005 WL 1320149, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 
June 2, 2005). 
 232. Thompson v. Rutherford County, Tenn., 318 F. App’x. 387, 389 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 233. Id. (Keith, J., dissenting on the basis that the district court abused its discretion in failing to 
xpu ce, compelling us to address this 
we have ancillary jurisdiction to expunge a record in an appropriate 
ase
 v. Bohr, 406 F.Supp. 1218 (E.D. Wis. 1976). 
c
e nge the record as the case “presents an extraordinary circumstan
jurisdictional issue and to find that 
c ”). 
 234. United States
 235. Id. at 1219–20. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 1220. 
 238. United States v. Williams, 582 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1346 (D. Utah 2008).  In Williams, the 
petitioner/defendant was arrested and pled guilty to one count of distribution of a controlled substance 
(co aine).  Id.  At the time of his arrest, he was a casual marijuana user and was attempting to obtain 
drugs at his friend’s request.  Unbeknownst to him, his friend was actually an undercover federal agent.  
Id.  The petitioner “was sentenced to three years of probation which he completed without incident.”  Id. 
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e defendant when petitioning the court for 
expungement.240 
b. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
does not fall within the scope of this purpose of ancillary jurisdiction.244  
advance because of his past criminal conviction.239  The Tenth Circuit 
has emphasized the importance of evidentiary proof of actual harms 
suffered by th
Other circuit courts assert that they will use their inherent power to 
expunge a conviction that is constitutionally infirm or the result of a 
clerical error, but will not use their equitable power to expunge any 
other type of conviction.241  For these circuits, in the absence of a 
federal statute or clear defect in the record, a petition for expungement 
will not be heard on the theory that equitable orders for expungment do 
not fit within the purposes of ancillary jurisdiction espoused by the 
Supreme Court in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of 
America.242  In Kokkonen, the Court asserted that ancillary jurisdiction 
exists under two separate principles: “(1) to permit disposition by a 
single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually 
interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function successfully, that is, 
to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its 
decrees.”243  Focusing on the second principle, several circuits 
determined that expungement based solely on equitable considerations 
 
 239. Id. at 1348.  The court distinguished this petitioner by two main factors: (1) he provided 
a result of his conviction; he 
 or an allegation that the criminal 
. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994).  The Court of Appeals for 
e tern District of California enforcing a settlement 
re
. . Kokkonen forecloses any ancillary 
documentary evidence proving the adverse consequences he faced as 
provided the court with his and (2) the United States Attorney supported the petition.  Id.  The court 
quoted the United States Attorney commenting that this is the type of “rare and extreme circumstance” 
that warrants the grant of a petition for expungement.  Id. 
 240. United States v. Friesen, 853 F.2d 816, 818 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 241. United States v. McMains, 540 F.2d 387, 389–90 (8th Cir. 1978) (“It is established that the 
federal courts have inherent power to expunge criminal records when necessary to preserve basic legal 
rights.  The power is a narrow one, usually exercised in cases of illegal prosecution or acquittals and is 
not to be routinely used.”); United States v. Dunegan, 251 F.3d 477, 480 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Thus, we hold 
that in absence of any applicable statute enacted by Congress,
proceedings were invalid or illegal, a District Court does not have the jurisdiction to expunge a criminal 
record, even when ending in an acquittal.”); United States v. Sumner, 226 F. 3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 
2000) (“In our view, a district court’s ancillary jurisdiction is limited to expunging the record of an 
unlawful arrest or conviction, or to correcting a clerical error.”). 
 242. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co
th Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the Eas
ag ement between insurer and insurance agent regarding a breach of agency agreement.  Id. at 377.  
The Court held that under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, the district court did not have the 
inherent power to enforce the agreement.  Id. 
 243. Id. at 379–80 (internal citations omitted). 
 244. United States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2007) (“We agree with the Third, Eighth, 
and Ninth Circuits that Kokkonen answers the question raised . . 
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Therefore, no such petitions will be heard in those circuits. 
These circuits refuse to hear petition for expungement based in 
equity.245  The underlying premise is that federal courts, although 
possessessing ancillary jurisdiction, may not preside over matters of 
expungement based solely on equitable principles because it constitutes 
a violation of separation of powers.246  Expanding the jurisdiction of 
federal courts can only be done by Congress.247 
2. State of the Law 
The federal circuit courts are divided over the authoritative power to 
grant judicial expungements based solely on equitable principles.  The 
tension is solely jurisdictional.  Despite the fact that the text of the 
Constitution clearly states that the jurisdiction of the judicial power 
extends to all cases in “Law and Equity,”248 some circuit courts are 
reluctant to assert their equitable power.  The fact that the federal 
circuits are split on the question of jurisdiction signals that the issue is 
ripe for Supreme Court review.  Thus, the Court may be inclined to 
grant certiorari to resolve the matter.  However, if Congress is proactive, 
federal policymakers could eliminate the need for Supreme Court review 
by crafting a statute explicitly granting federal courts jurisdiction to hear 
judicial petitions for expungement. 
C. Summary 
The Executive and Judicial branches of the federal government could 
theoretically grant expungements to non-violent ex-offenders.  The 
President, after granting a pardon, could provide an order expunging the 
record of conviction.  The federal courts could find the requisite 
jurisdiction to hear petitions for expungement through its inherent 
power.  However, both of these branches refrain from using the full 
 
jurisdiction to order expungement based on . . . equitable reasons.”); Dunegan, 251 F.3d at 479 (finding 
that ancillary jurisdiction as enunciated in Kokkonen does not include petitions for expungement of 
criminal records); Sumner, 226 F.3d at 1010 (citing Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 375, as the basis for 
restricting judicial power on the issue of criminal expungements). 
 245. Coloian, 480 F.3d at 52 (“We therefore find that the district court did not have jurisdiction to 
consider Coloian’s request for expungement of his criminal record on equitable grounds.”). 
 246. Sumner, 226 F.3d at 1014 (“[T]he expungement of the record of  a valid arrest and conviction 
usurps the powers that the framers of the Constitution allocated to Congress, the Executive, and the 
states.”). 
 247. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”). 
 248. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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power gr ith this, 
Congress remains the only branch of government with the constitutional 
au
cut.  These three states have implemented 
different approaches to successfully integrate the ex-offender into the 
community by offering a carrot for those who are productive and remain 
crime free.  The federal government can look to these state mechanisms 
wh
etition the Commissioner of Probation to 
se
record” on the application.254  Non-compliance could result in a suit in 
anted to them by the United States Constitution.  W
thority to implement comprehensive federal expungement legislation. 
IV. STATES’ EXPERIMENTS WITH OFFENDER REENTRY 
States have their own unique process and customs that are typically 
codified as a permanent expression of the popular will.  With regard to 
ameliorating the effects of conviction on its constituent offenders, many 
states have a legislatively sanctioned mechanism in place allowing the 
offender a chance to clear his criminal history.  This Part looks at the 
expungement programs offered by three states: Massachusetts, 
California, and Connecti
en crafting a solution. 
A. Massachusetts 
Despite the state’s longstanding tradition of permitting public 
inspection of court records,249 Massachusetts has a statutory mechanism 
permitting ex-offenders to p
al criminal history information.250  There is also a statutory method 
where District Court judges are permitted to seal records of first-offense 
possession of marijuana.251  For purposes of this Article, only the first 
approach will be examined. 
A sealing in Massachusetts means that the documents are only 
accessible by the court, unless the court authorizes limited disclosure.252  
Sealed records allow a defendant to answer “no record” for inquiries by 
employers regarding arrests, criminal court appearances, and 
convictions.253  Any application for employment in Massachusetts 
where the employer seeks criminal history information must contain 
language permitting an applicant with a sealed record to answer “no 
 
 249. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10 (2009) (guaranteeing public access to public records). 
 250. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (adult criminal dispositions), 100B (juvenile delinquency 
le cause) (2009). 
28 n.12 (Mass. 2009). 
S. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (2009). 
dispositions), 100C (not guilty dispositions/no probab
 251. MASS. GEN .LAWS ch. 1102, § 1 (2009). 
 252. Pixley v. Commonwealth, 906 N.E.2d 320, 3
 253. MAS
 254. Id. 
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ey General in superior court.255  In addition, a 
se
ns are met, the 
Co
placed in a sealed envelope and are identifiable by the name of the 
equity taken by the Attorn
aled record does not disqualify a person from public service, and the 
record cannot be admitted into evidence except when imposing a 
sentence for a subsequent conviction.256 
The process has become fairly standardized requiring the defendant to 
apply for a sealing through the Commissioner of Probation.257  A 
specific form must be used, but it is easily accessible and 
uncomplicated.258  The statute requires the Commissioner to comply 
with the request so long as there have been no new criminal convictions 
or imprisonment, in Massachusetts or elsewhere, the defendant is not 
required to register as a sex-offender, there are no statutory exclusions 
applicable to the defendant, no firearm convictions, perjury, escape, or 
State Ethics Violations, and the statutorily proscribed time period has 
elapsed since the last conviction, which is ten years for misdemeanor 
crimes and fifteen years for felonies.259  The clock begins to toll once all 
sentence requirements terminate.260  If all conditio
mmissioner will seal the record and notify the court clerk and chief 
probation officer of the courts in which the convictions stand so that all 
records of the proceedings are subsequently sealed.261 
The mechanics of sealing a criminal case are not overly difficult.  In 
Massachusetts, docket entries are sealed by covering the pertinent 
information with opaque tape so that none of the information can be 
read.262  The original docket sheet remains in the docket with “Sealed 
Record” recorded on the front.263  All case papers and related files are 
 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Comm’r of Prob., Petition To Seal, available at http://www.masslegalhelp.org/cori/forms-
eal Criminal Records Sooner, BROCKTON 
ews/x836550449/Activists-want-law-to-
0). 
 & EXPUNGEMENT OF DISTRICT COURT RECORDS 39 n.121 (2009) available at 
ss.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/districtcourt/pubaccesscourtrecords.pdf (last visited 
ar ). 
and-letters/petition-to-seal-conviction-aged-out-cases.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2010).  Additionally, the 
form can be requested by calling the office of the Commissioner of Probation. 
 259. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (1) – (4) (2009).  There is currently pending legislation 
to change the time period to five years for misdemeanors and ten years for felonies.  See An Act 
reforming the administrative procedures relative to criminal offender record information and pre-and 
post-trial supervised release, S. 2220, 186th Cong. § 16 (as passed by Senate, Mass. November 30, 
2009); see also Nancy Reardon, Activists Want Law to S
ENTERPRISE, July 28, 2009, http://www.enterprisenews.com/n
seal-criminal-records-sooner (last visited March 18, 201
 260. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (1), (2) (2009). 
 261. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (2009). 
 262. DIST. COURT DEP’T OF THE TRIAL COURT, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., A GUIDE TO PUBLIC 
ACCESS, SEALING
http://www.ma
M ch 14, 2010
 263. Id. 
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me of the 
person using the record are recorded on the front of the envelope.268  
When finished with the inform rd is resealed.269 
rally not required to disclose 
a 
.   This process requires that the 
 
defendant and related docket numbers.264  The sealed envelope is kept in 
a secure place out of public reach.265  A sealed record index is kept by 
each department and is not available to the public.266  A sealed record is 
authorized to be used in a manner consistent with statute.267  In the event 
a record is unsealed, the date of the unsealing and the na
ation, the reco
B. California 
California has in place a dismissal program for misdemeanor and 
felony convictions.  This system places the authority to dismiss 
convictions within the jurisdiction of the courts and does not seal, 
destroy, or remove case information from any of the three branches of 
government.  However, individuals are gene
conviction if it was dismissed unless the question arises in the context 
of government employment or licensing.270 
The process for obtaining a dismissal of prior convictions depends on 
the classification of the crime.  Theoretically there is no waiting period 
for obtaining a dismissal.  Defendants may begin the process while on 
probation or serving their sentence in county jail.271  Misdemeanor 
convictions require the defendant to petition for dismissal of the 
convictions in the superior court where the conviction stands.272  Felony 
convictions where the defendant received a sentence of probation and/or 
county jail time are a two-step process.  First, a defendant files a petition 
to have the felony reduced to a misdemeanor.273  Once reduction is 
secured, the defendant files another petition to have the “misdemeanor” 
dismissed in accordance with the misdemeanor petition rules.274  Felony 
convictions where the defendant was sentenced to state prison, to the 
custody of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation requires a 
ten year waiting period, or to both 275
 264. Id. 
121. 
E REGS tit. 2, § 7287(d) (2009). 
ot specifying any waiting period). 
E § 17(b) (West 2010). 
. PENAL CODE § 4852.01 (West 2010). 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 39 n.122. 
 268. Id. at 39 n.
 269. Id. 
 270. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West 2010); CAL. COD
 271. See § 1203.4 (n
 272. § 1203.4. 
 273. CAL. PENAL COD
 274. § 1203.4. 
 275. CAL
39
Silva: CLEAN SLATE: EXPANDING EXPUNGEMENTS AND PARDONS FOR NON-VIOLENT F
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011
SILVA FINAL FORMAT 2 2/11/2011  3:48:56 PM 
194 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
defendant petition the court for a Certificate of Rehabilitation and 
subsequently apply for a pardon.  
 pardon to the Board of Pardons and Parole 
(B
pically an individual 
wi
on, deny the 
pe
 
276
C. Connecticut 
In Connecticut, absolute pardons have the dual effect of forgiving and 
expunging the record of conviction.  The governor of Connecticut has 
delegated the power to
oard).277  In turn, the Board uses its discretion to determine whether to 
grant an individual a provisional pardon, an absolute pardon, or to deny 
the petition outright.278 
The applicant may apply three years after completing his sentence for 
a misdemeanor and five years after a felony.279  Ty
ll have completed their sentence prior to applying for a pardon.  
However, in “extraordinary” circumstances, the Board will grant a 
pardon prior to the termination of a sentence.280 
The applicant is required to fill out a ten page questionnaire that 
includes the reporting of child support orders, employment history, 
criminal history, and basic demographic information.281  It also requires 
that the applicant obtain at least three references, all of whom must be 
aware of the applicant’s criminal history, provide the board with the 
criminal history printout from the state police and all police reports 
related to the applicant’s criminal convictions over the previous  ten 
years.282  Once the application is received, the Board notifies the State’s 
Attorney and the victim if there is one.283  Barring a request for a 
hearing by the State’s Attorney or victim and after review of the 
documentary information, the Board decides whether to grant the 
petition through either an absolute or provisional pard
tition, or grant the applicant a hearing.284  If a hearing is granted, the 
applicant appears before the Board to answer questions.  After the 
hearing, the Board either grants or denies the application. 
An absolute pardon is an expungement.285  If granted, the individual 
 276. Id. 
 277. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-130a(a) (2010). 
-130a(c). 
on, http://www.ct.gov/ 
/PardonFormerOffender.pdf (last visited March 16, 2010). 
 54-142a(d), 54-124a(j)(2), (3) (2010). 
. 
 278. § 54-130a(b). 
 279. § 54
 280. Id. 
 281. Board of Pardons and Parole, Expungement/Provisional Pardon Petiti
doc/lib/doc/PDF/form
 282. Id. 
 283. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§
 284. § 54-124a(j)(2), (3)
 285. § 54-142a(d). 
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n or grants 
a 
rants were virtually non-
existent.   However, since that time the Board has granted over one 
hundred absolute pardons an s recently begun to use the 
provisional pardon with more consisten 1 
is not required by law to disclose convictions.  A provisional pardon is 
used for employment purposes only and does not expunge the record of 
conviction.286  The individual is still required to disclose convictions 
when asked.287  However, he can use the provisional pardon as an 
advocacy tool.  The intended effect of the provisional pardon is to 
demonstrate to employers that the Board considers the applicant 
trustworthy enough to hire.288  The applicant may also re-apply for an 
absolute pardon in one year.  When the Board denies a petitio
provisional pardon, it provides the applicant with the reasoning 
underlying its decision, which allows the applicant to conform his 
conduct in a manner most conducive to securing a pardon.289 
The Board of Pardons and Paroles uses the pardoning mechanism 
quite frequently.  Prior to 2004, pardon g
290
nually and ha
cy.29
D. Summary 
Examining state expungement mechanisms demonstrates that 
expungement is considered a viable reentry strategy by state legislators.  
Moreover, expungement programs can be crafted and carried out in a 
number of different ways with the deciding body being legislative, 
judicial, or executive.  Little empirical research has been done regarding 
the effects of expungement, and research is needed to assess the success 
 
 286. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-130a(e) (2010). 
 287. Id. 
 288. An Act Concerning Criminal Justice Policy and Planning, H.R. 5781 (Conn. 2006).  See also 
OFFICE OF LEGAL RESEARCH, H.R. 5781, AN ACT CONCERNING CERTIFICATES OF EMPLOYABILITY AND 
REHABILITATION (2006). 
 289. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-124a(j)(2)(A)(3) (2010). 
 290. Board of Pardons and Parole, Pardons Counts, http://www.ct.gov/doc/lib/doc/PDF 
/PDFReport/PardonsCounts.pdf (last visited March 21, 2010). 
 291. Id.  This source provides the following data: 
 
YEAR APPLICATIONS RECEIVED NO. OF PARDONS 
GRANTED 
2004 303 145 
2005 347 188 
2006 393 220 
2007 495 312 + 4 Provisional  
2008 835 467 + 32 Provisional 
2009 1290 413 + 66 Provisional 
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 the absolute solution to reentry, it is 
a partial resolution to the growing number of non-violent federal ex-
offenders wh iding lives.  
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and California appear to agree that 
ex
ng regulations, benefits rules, and federal educational 
as
 
the 
au
 
or failure of the state programs.  However, Connecticut has increasingly 
granted pardons over the past six years, and Massachusetts is 
considering reducing the waiting period required to obtain a sealing.  
While expungement is by no means
o want to lead productive and law ab
pungement is a viable response. 
V. A CASE FOR CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION 
The proliferation of federal criminal statutes in the 1960s effectively 
created a federal criminal code.  Under the auspices of the Commerce 
power, Congress created a new class of criminal—the federal offender.  
Unlike the states, which traditionally manage criminal offenders, the 
federal government was unprepared to deal with the aftermath of its 
legislation.  To further compound the matter, Congress enacted 
numerous statutes and regulations that triggered collateral consequences 
including housi
sistance eligibility.  The after-effects now require Congress to develop 
an effective, cost-efficient, and workable solution.  It is the only branch 
of government with the constitutional authority to redirect these 
consequences. 
As has been demonstrated in Part III, current federal law is confusing 
at best.  The executive pardoning power does little to successfully 
integrate ex-offenders that the President has chosen to pardon.  It does 
nothing to solve the practical and real life problems associated with 
conviction: the easy accessibility of criminal records and the stigma 
attached to conviction.  It is also quite likely that pardons recently 
aroused public suspicion of corruptibility with the Clinton pardons in 
2001.292  A judicial petition for expungement is not a better alternative. 
The federal courts remain divided questioning if they even have 
thority to expunge.  Not only that, some ex-offenders are deprived of 
the opportunity to petition the courts by virtue of the circuit where the 
conviction stands.  Neither of the two branches provide a reliable post-
conviction remedy and relief from these branches is seldom granted. 
While Congress has already enacted legislation providing assistance 
 292. Editorial, An Indefensible Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2001, at A18 (opining that Clinton’s 
pardon of Marc Rich, a commodities dealer who fled prosecution to Switzerland, was indefensible and 
arguing that there is a difference between pardoning someone who pays in full and someone who 
purposely avoids adjudication); Editorial, The Pardons Look More Sordid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at 
A22 (reporting that President Clinton may have discussed a pardon with a Democratic fundraiser). 
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imed at assisting ex-offenders, among other 
dis
tle VII does 
no
 
for the reentering releasee, these initiatives did not and do not go far 
enough.  Beginning in the late 1960s, Congress began to show lukewarm 
concern for the economic position of ex-offenders.  Legislators worked 
to provide incentives to employers with the goal of influencing hiring 
practices.  In 1966, the United States Department of Labor (USDOL) 
created the Federal Bonding program,293 and the Reagan Administration 
implemented the Work Opportunity Tax Credit.294  Both of these 
programs were a
advantaged groups, in securing employment from private sector 
employers.  These programs provided limited assistance in one 
fundamental area in a time where collateral consequences existed and 
were not as potent. 
Arguably, Congress could repeal or modify existing federal statutes 
and regulations that work as post-conviction penalties.  While possible, 
this approach is open to two criticisms: (1) it leaves the problem of 
employer access wide open; and (2) there are an overwhelming number 
of statutes and regulations.  Without expungement, private employers 
maintain the ability to inquire into the criminal history of an individual 
before even extending an offer of employment.  Disqualification on the 
basis of a criminal conviction would likely continue.295  Ti
t prohibit discrimination on the basis of a criminal record.296  Second, 
there are numerous statutes and regulations that impose collateral 
 293. Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, 42 U.S.C. § 2571 (repealed 1969, but 
adopted by State and local operating agencies).  The Federal Bonding Program guarantees the employer 
honesty from a high-risk job seeker.  High-risk job seekers are those who have committed acts deemed 
fraudulent or dishonest in the past or who have demonstrated past behaviors that make their honesty or 
credibility questionable.  This includes ex-offenders.  Historically, employers have not hired from this 
category of job applicants on a variety of grounds.  A major reason for the exclusion of ex-offenders is 
that commercial bond insurance companies do not cover this group as they are designated as “NOT 
BONDABLE.”  The Federal Bonding program, however, provides commercial insurance to the 
employer free of charge for six months as an incentive to hire high-risk job seekers.  The insurance will 
reimburse the employer for any losses due to employee dishonesty with no deductible amount to the 
employees.  Once the employee demonstrates job honesty for six months then he or she will be 
considered bondable for life under the commercially Fidelity Insurance bonds. 
 294. I.R.C. § 51 (2006).  The Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) is a federal tax credit that is 
available to all private sector businesses.  The original purpose was as an incentive to private sector 
employers to hire individuals from targeted groups, who traditionally experience high rates of 
unemployment.  Individuals who have been convicted of a felony and were hired more than one year 
after the last date on which he was convicted or released from prison, qualifies the employer to receive 
the tax credit.  Employers will receive a $2400 tax credit for each ex-offender hired who has worked a 
minimum of 120 to 400 hours. 
 295. Although many states have statutes prohibiting such discrimination, individuals rarely use 
them because of the issues of proof.  Employers rarely write the reason for not selecting a candidate and 
even when they do it is likely general standard denial. 
 296. It is likely that an amendment to Title VII including the prohibition of discrimination on the 
basis of a criminal conviction would suffer from the same shortfalls as the state statutes. 
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pungements.  Doing so could potentially 
clog the dockets of federal courts and divert resources from customary 
court matters.  Moreove uld then be subject to 
discretionary judgment.  ction would remove 
tra
bility to live a dignified life and not be forced into a 
pe
bankruptcy to the situation of federal offenders and 
 
consequences.  It would likely take significant resources and political 
will to sift through, sort, and modify decades of legislation. 
It is also possible that Congress could statutorily prescribe jurisdiction 
to the federal courts to grant ex
r, expungement wo
Giving the courts jurisdi
nsparency from the process. 
A. A New Approach 
The purpose behind expungement is to wipe the proverbial slate 
clean, allowing formerly convicted citizens to live in America without a 
lifelong struggle with collateral consequences.  In the context of crime 
and recidivism, expungement could be a tool to integrate ex-offenders 
into the community through an incentive structure.  This structure would 
be transparent, practicable, and codified.  Interestingly, Congress has 
already experimented with this type of system: it created a quasi-
expungement system with the Bankruptcy Code.  Bankruptcy itself is 
designed with the purpose of discharging one’s debt.297  This discharge 
prevents creditors from any further collection.298  A central aspect of 
bankruptcy policy is the concept of the “fresh start;”299 debtors should 
have the a
rmanently impoverished existence.300  In calculating a cost-benefit 
analysis, a debtor can do better for himself and his community when 
released from financial liabilities and restored to solid economic 
footing.301 
The same rationale may be applied to the non-violent federal 
offender.  Once the offender discharges his debt to society, further 
collection on that debt, in the form of life-long collateral consequences, 
should be barred.  Normatively speaking, an offender is likely to do 
better for himself and his community once he is released from collateral 
liabilities and allowed to maximize his opportunities.  Thus, Congress 
can apply the theoretical justifications and safeguards that protect 
debtors in 
 297. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 325, 370 (1991). 
 298. JEFF FERRIELL & EDWARD J. JANGER, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 456 (2d ed. 2007). 
 299. Bernard R. Trujillo, The Wisconsin Exemption Clause Debate of 1846: An Historical 
Perspective on the Regulation of Debt, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 747 (1998). 
 300. Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 47 (1997). 
 301. Trujillo, supra note 299, at 762. 
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expungement.  This taken together with the objectives outlined in the 
Second Chance Act can provide a principled framework for federal 
ex
tence.  Having a publicly accessible criminal 
co
.S.C.304  With a Second Chance Advisory group, the 
U.
almost any federal, state, and local resources needed to efficiently fulfill 
pungement legislation.  Both call for a second chance for the 
defendant. 
1. Structure 
As discussed in Part II, recidivism rates among non-violent offenders 
decline with the passage of time.302  After three years post release, the 
likelihood of recidivism is two per one thousand individuals 
recidivating.  Non-recidivists having kept themselves out of prison 
should be permitted to petition society for a clean slate some time after 
completion of their sen
nviction will work as a lifelong cost the non-recidivist pays in future 
potential opportunity.  Upon a showing of a law-abiding and productive 
life as defined by eligibility criteria, the non-recidivist should have an 
opportunity to petition for society’s acceptance of full integration in the 
American social order. 
The U.S.S.C. should create a Second Chance Advisory Group to 
determine how best to ameliorate the collateral consequences of federal 
convictions.  As part of the judicial branch, the U.S.S.C. already has in 
place the resources, access and structural support needed to investigate, 
craft, and execute a post-conviction expungement initiative.303  The 
congressional mandate of the U.S.S.C., namely to provide Congress 
with recommendations regarding the sentencing guidelines, places the 
purpose of a Second Chance Advisory Group in line with the legislative 
purpose of theU.S
S.S.C. may be used as a vehicle for researching and recommending 
legislative policy initiatives that will effectively slash both incarceration 
and opportunity costs.  It has been given nearly unlimited access to 
its obligations.305 
 
 302. HARER, supra note 6, at 9. 
 303. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006). 
 304. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) (2006) (“Duties of the Commission (a) The Commission, by 
affirmative vote of at least four members of the Commission, and pursuant to its rules and regulations 
and consistent with all pertinent provisions of any Federal statute shall promulgate and distribute to all 
courts of the United States and to the United States Probation System— . . . (2) general policy 
statements regarding application of the guidelines or any other aspect of sentencing or sentence 
pl
ote of a majority of the members present and voting, shall have the power to . . . (5) 
im ementation that in the view of the Commission would further purposes set forth in section 
3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code . . . .”).  See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006) (setting forth 
the application and implementation procedures of the sentencing guidelines). 
 305. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 995 (2006); see also 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(5) (2006) (“The 
Commission, by v
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 These include the Probation Officers Advisory Group, the 
Practitioners Advisory Group, and the Victims Advisory Group.308  This 
seems to be the next logical s y addressing federal criminal 
recidivism. 
. 
ai
ungement would interact with state law.  The group could 
also consider other issues and remedies including the repeal of statutory 
 
The creation of a Second Chance Advisory group would not be 
innovative, as the U.S.S.C. has previously created advisory groups for 
the purpose of facilitating “formal and informal input to the 
Commission.”306  Currently, there are three advisory groups to the 
U.S.S.C.307 
tep in full
2. Duties 
A Second Chance Advisory Group could be the lead agency on 
federal offender reentry.  This group could conduct fresh and current 
recidivism studies specifically aimed at BOP releasees giving the 
U.S.S.C. the updated data needed to craft sound legislative policy.  A 
Second Chance Advisory group would have the ability to investigate and 
evaluate successful state sealing or expungement programs paying 
particular attention to collateral consequences, e.g., exceptions to 
statutory collateral consequences and administrative procedures for re-
licensing, and restoration of civil rights statutes.  This group could 
develop efficient and workable evidence-based programs proven to 
smooth the transition from prison to society.  The primary objective 
would be to craft a recommendation or amendment to the U.S.S.C
med at combating the numerous collateral consequences arising out of 
conviction in the federal system.  One such remedy could be the 
development and implementation of a federal expungement procedure. 
The Second Chance Advisory Group could be charged with thinking 
through many issues, including whether expungement would be 
automatic after certain eligibility criteria were met; determining the 
required post-conviction waiting period; the agency to which 
applications would be addressed; whether this procedure would be 
administrative; whether this remedy would be subject to review; how 
federal exp
utilize, with their consent, the services, equipment, personnel, information, and facilities of other 
Federal, State, local, and private agencies and instrumentalities with or without reimbursement 
therefore . . . .”). 
 306. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 4 (2007), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/general/RULES11_01.pdf. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id.  See also U.S. Probation Officers Advisory Group, Charter, http://www.ussc.gov/POAG/ 
charter.html (last visited February 26, 2010); Practitioners Advisory Group, http://www.ussc.gov/PAG/ 
PAGindex.html (last visited February 26, 2010). 
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and regulato pungement 
authority. 
e human behavior itself is uncertain.  
On
a similar study and found the same 
res
The statistical tool used by the United States Board of Parole to predict 
ry collateral consequences and expanded ex
3. Recommended Recidivism Risk Assessment 
Expunging a criminal conviction is a matter of serious public concern.  
Before American society expunges criminal convictions, it wants to 
make sure that individuals will not reoffend.  On one hand, no such 
guarantees can be made.  The government can never guarantee that an 
individual will not recidivate becaus
 the other hand, there are tools that assist in predicting the likelihood 
of recidivism and that make fewer errors than human judgment—
statistical methods of prediction.309 
Statistical devices for predicting recidivism have been used by the 
federal government in the past.  For example, they have been used in the 
context of parole prior to its abolition.310  In 1928, E.W. Burgess 
described his classic work in prediction methods.311  In an experiment 
conducted thirty years later by Gottfredson, the results were the same: 
the statistical prediction fared better.312  Indeed, statistical prediction 
analysis has consistently fared better than clinical judgments.313  In 
1957, Paul Meehl conducted 
ults.314  The decision makers’ subjective biases and prejudices are 
excluded from the prediction table making the process more objective 
than if left to human judgment. 
The decision to parole an individual was primarily based on the 
individual offender’s risk of violating conditions and/or re-offending.315  
 
 309. PAUL MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION 90–119 (1954) (comparing 
clinical and statistical methods of prediction in twenty studies including corrections and education with 
approximately half showing statistical superiority and the other half showing almost no difference); 
JOAN NUFFIELD, PAROLE DECISION-MAKING IN CANADA: RESEARCH TOWARDS DECISION GUIDELINES 
 
1. E.W. Burgess, Factors Making For Success or Failure On Parole, in THE WORKINGS OF THE 
ORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: 
QUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME (1967). 
12 (1983).  See also Andrew Vachss, Parole as Post-Conviction Relief: The Robert Lewis Decision, 9
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 20–27 (1975). 
 310. LLOYD E. OHLIN, SELECTION FOR PAROLE: A MANUAL of PAROLE PREDICTION 23 (1951). 
 31
INDETERMINATE-SENTENCE LAW AND THE PAROLE SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS (Andrew A. Bruce et al. eds., 
1928). 
 312. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF
JUVENILE DELIN
 313. NUFFIELD, supra note 309, at 14. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Anne M. Heinz et al., Sentencing By Parole Board: An Evaluation, 67 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2 (1976). 
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d has recently been determined to be a better 
pr
idivism studies as well as 
inv
on tables are rarely 100% efficient.   
Human behavior and environmental pressure may never be totally 
captured by predictive an
that risk was the Salient Factor Score (SFS).316  The SFS was an 
instrument originally developed from Burgess’s 1928 study of three 
Illinois correctional facilities.317  Burgess crafted a twenty-one–factor 
test used to grade inmates with the purpose of determining the likelihood 
of parole success.318  In the 1970s, Peter Hoffman, then director of 
research at the United States Board of Parole, crafted and implemented 
the SFS319.  The SFS included only nine out of the original twenty-one 
selection criteria an
edictor of recidivism than the U.S.S.C.’s use of the Criminal History 
Category (CHC).320 
The use of a statistical tool modeled after the actuarial tables of 
Burgess and the SFS could be employed in order to: (1) predict the 
likelihood of recidivism for individual petitioners; (2) create a uniform 
risk assessment tool based on codified eligibility criteria; (3) allow for 
transparency; and (4) collect data for future rec
estigate successful integration strategies.  As with all statistical tools, 
this model has advantages and disadvantages. 
The problems with the prediction tables are inherent in any statistical 
approach.  A perfect statistical model would take the uncertainty out of 
the equation.321  However, predicti 322
alysis.323 
a. Eligibility Criteria 
Eligibility criteria should be modeled after the best predictive factors 
of recidivism.  The most useful information will be obtained through up-
to-date studies tracking recidivism for specific cohorts.  This data will 
serve to inventory characteristics of successful release.  In addition, 
studies conducted by Burgess to Lloyd Ohlin and Peter Hoffman are rich 
in information regarding best predictive factors.  Reassessing this 
information could potentially provide a spring board for a new statistical 
 
 
PROBATION 49, 49 (1997). 
316. Peter B. Hoffman, History of the Federal Parole System: Part 2 (1973–1997), 61 FED. 
 317. Burgess, supra note 311. 
 318. Id. at 221. 
 319. Hoffman, supra note 316, at 49–52. 
 320. MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra note 6, at 1–2, 12 (explaining that the SFS was designed to 
measure only recidivism while the CHC was used to measure recidivism and reflect offender 
culpability). 
 321. NUFFIELD, supra note 309, at 14–15. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. 
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should also be analyzed.  Taken together, this should be 
enough information to construct an up-to-date statistical tool used for the 
dual purpose of predictin idivism in the context of 
expungement and also serving as  criteria for a potential 
pe
ition.  The 
Second Chance Advisory Group could research and experiment with 
different systems u and most effective 
system to break the cy y by giving 
no
re are also individual privacy 
rig
invasion of individual privacy which is reprehended and to be, so far as 
model.  The use and success of previous statistical tools, such as the SFS 
and CHC, 
g the likelihood of rec
eligibility
titioner. 
4. Clinical Judgment 
While statistical models of prediction fare better than clinical 
judgments, it would be an error to discount the value in human opinion.  
Human judgment could contribute in those borderline, “hard-to-tell” 
cases: those cases where an individual falls within a statistical range 
where the likelihood of recidivism could go either way.  With this, a 
Second Act Commission could be created and called on to determine 
those cases on a case by case basis and through a codified hearing 
procedure.  Such a Commission should consist of a diverse mix of 
persons and have an odd number of members.  They could serve as 
hearing officers in those intermediate cases, allowing individuals to 
present themselves before making a determination on the pet
ntil it has discovered the best 
cle of criminal recidivism, preferabl
n-violent federal offenders the opportunity of a clean slate. 
B. Concerns with Expungement 
At this juncture, there are many questions and concerns with respect 
to a federal legislative expungement program.  One question regards the 
right of the public to inspect public records.  The Supreme Court 
provided guidance on this issue in Nixon v. Warner Communications, 
Inc.324  In that case the court firmly asserted, “that the right to inspect 
and copy judicial records is not absolute.  Every court has supervisory 
power over its own records and files, and access has been denied where 
court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes.”325  
While it is America’s practice to allow the copy and inspection of public 
documents, it is not an unlimited right.  The
hts that should be respected and balanced.  “It is the unwarranted 
 
 324. Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1970). 
 325. Id. at 1312. 
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re the law recognizes the 
ind
ch.  Private 
ownership of this information could cause major intellectual property, 
constitutional, and contractua  is an issue that the Second 
Chance Advisory Group would be cha
th the data 
collected from these studies, the Second Chance Advisory Group can 
provide Congress with guidance and a variety of recommended 
 
possible, prevented.”326  These two rights should be balanced in order to 
maximize the benefit to American society. 
Another argument asserts that expunging a criminal conviction would 
also prevent employers from obtaining a full and accurate history of 
prospective employees.  Wanting to know the criminal background of 
individuals who will have expansive access to cash registers and retail 
merchandise is a legitimate concern.  However, an expungement 
program would serve as a character screening tool for society in general.  
Moreover, there must be some point whe
ividual’s “right to be let alone.”327  After expungement, an individual 
should be allowed to pick up where he left off without intrusions into his 
past.  He is to begin anew with a clean slate. 
An expungement system may encounter problems on a different front.  
Many private companies have entered the criminal records business by 
“mining” criminal information from state systems.328  These companies 
then turn around and sell this information to anyone for a price.329  
Expunging an individual’s criminal history may not prevent this 
information from being completely out of public rea
l issues.  This
rged with resolving. 
C. Summary 
While Congress has implemented legislation aimed at providing 
employer incentives for hiring ex-offenders, it has fallen short of 
successfully integrating individuals back into mainstream society.  It has 
especially failed to manage reentry for federal ex-offenders.  The 
creation of a Second Chance Advisory Group could begin the process of 
resolving the pressing issues of over-incarceration, federal offender 
reentry, and collateral consequences.  As noted above, the first step 
begins with empirical studies aimed at investigating current federal 
recidivism trends, successful state reentry programs, and general 
attitudes toward non-violent offenders and expungement.  Wi
 326. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 214 
(1890). 
 327. Id. at 193. 
 328. John Geffen & Stefanie Letze, Chained To The Past: An Overview of Criminal Expungement 
Law In Minnesota – State v. Schultz, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1331, 1334 (2005). 
 329. Id. 
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enders from employment, education, housing, and participating in 
the
ssful 
ev
Americans that have served their time 
in the federal penitentiary only to be black-balled from American 
society.  Incarceration and recidivism are no longer a sustainable option 
not only for ex-offenders but for the national economy as well.  
Something must be done to resolve this issue, and Congress is the 
branch that must lead the charge. 
legislative initiatives to address non-violent offender reentry. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is understood that in civilized nations criminal law and prison serve 
an important purpose—they punish criminal behavior.  In America, the 
punishment does not end after imprisonment.  Federal and state 
regulations continue punishment long after release.  This works to bar 
ex-off
 political process, forcing the ex-offender to take part in the criminal 
underworld for money, social acceptance, and community engagement.  
This typically results in a return to prison and loss of opportunity.  The 
cycle of criminality perpetuates itself while the costs of incarceration 
soar. 
While not a perfect system the creation of a Second Chance Advisory 
Group, could begin to provide answers and offer remedies to a number 
of different concerns.  This group would have the resources to conduct 
thorough empirical studies regarding the issues confronting federal ex-
offenders while simultaneously combing the country for succe
idence-based programs to emulate and implement as part of the 
federal criminal justice system.  As demonstrated in Part III, pardons are 
symbolic and judicial petitions are rare.  Currently, there is no legal 
mechanism available to non-violent federal offenders to clear their 
names even after decades of productivity and law-abiding conduct. 
America, hailed the “land of second chances,” appears to be a 
rhetorical myth to the millions of 
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